{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/cmd.exe/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["Elastic Defend","Microsoft Defender XDR","SentinelOne Cloud Funnel"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["execution","windows","cmd.exe"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Elastic","Microsoft","SentinelOne"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies unusual parent processes spawning \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e on Windows systems. While \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e is a legitimate command-line interpreter, adversaries can exploit it by launching it from atypical parent processes to execute malicious commands stealthily. The rule focuses on identifying \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e instances spawned by uncommon parent processes like \u003ccode\u003elsass.exe\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ecsrss.exe\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003eregsvr32.exe\u003c/code\u003e, which may indicate unauthorized or suspicious activity. The rule is based on the EQL query language and is designed for data generated by Elastic Defend, Microsoft Defender XDR, and SentinelOne Cloud Funnel, as well as Sysmon event logs. This detection helps in early threat detection by flagging anomalies in process relationships.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to the system (e.g., through phishing or exploiting a vulnerability).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker executes a malicious payload on the system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe malicious payload spawns \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e to execute commands.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e process is launched by an unusual parent process, such as \u003ccode\u003elsass.exe\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ecsrss.exe\u003c/code\u003e, instead of typical processes like \u003ccode\u003eexplorer.exe\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e process executes malicious commands, such as downloading additional payloads, modifying system configurations, or exfiltrating data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e process to establish persistence on the system by creating scheduled tasks or modifying registry keys.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker performs lateral movement by using \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e to access other systems on the network.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker achieves their final objective, such as data theft, system compromise, or ransomware deployment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful attack leveraging an unusual parent process for \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e can lead to a range of adverse outcomes, including system compromise, data theft, and ransomware deployment. The impact can vary depending on the attacker\u0026rsquo;s objectives and the level of access they gain. Without proper detection and response, organizations can suffer financial losses, reputational damage, and operational disruption. The severity is dependent on the specific commands executed via the spawned command prompt.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the provided EQL query to your Elastic Security environment to detect unusual parent processes for \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging (Event ID 1) to capture the necessary data for this detection and ensure proper configuration.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTune the EQL query for your environment by excluding legitimate parent processes, identified in the \u0026ldquo;False positive analysis\u0026rdquo; section, that may trigger false positives (e.g., \u003ccode\u003eSearchIndexer.exe\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eWUDFHost.exe\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by this rule to determine the nature of the malicious activity and the extent of the compromise.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement enhanced monitoring and logging for \u003ccode\u003ecmd.exe\u003c/code\u003e and its parent processes to detect similar anomalies in the future.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eConsider deploying endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions like Elastic Defend, Microsoft Defender XDR, or SentinelOne Cloud Funnel for enhanced visibility and protection.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-unusual-cmd-parent/","summary":"The detection rule identifies cmd.exe instances spawned by uncommon parent processes, such as lsass.exe, csrss.exe, or regsvr32.exe, which may indicate unauthorized or suspicious activity, thus aiding in early threat detection.","title":"Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-unusual-cmd-parent/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — Cmd.exe","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}