Cloudwatch — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/cloudwatch/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000AWS CloudWatch Log Group Deletion for Defense Evasionhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-aws-cloudwatch-log-deletion/Wed, 03 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-aws-cloudwatch-log-deletion/Detection of AWS CloudWatch log group deletions via CloudTrail logs, excluding console-based actions, indicating potential defense evasion by attackers attempting to hide their tracks.Attackers may delete CloudWatch log groups to remove evidence of their activities within an AWS environment. This action, identified through DeleteLogGroup events in CloudTrail, allows them to evade detection and forensic analysis. The activity is detected by monitoring CloudTrail logs for successful log group deletions, excluding those initiated from the AWS console. This behavior is significant because it directly undermines the logging and monitoring infrastructure that defenders rely on for incident response and threat hunting. The original Splunk ES-CU analytic was published in 2026-05-05, but the underlying technique is still relevant.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker gains unauthorized access to an AWS account.
  2. The attacker enumerates existing CloudWatch log groups using AWS CLI or API calls to identify potential targets for deletion.
  3. The attacker uses compromised credentials or a compromised IAM role to execute the DeleteLogGroup API call via AWS CLI, SDK, or API.
  4. CloudTrail logs the DeleteLogGroup event with eventSource = logs.amazonaws.com and a successful errorCode.
  5. The attacker may repeat this process for multiple log groups to eliminate a broader range of forensic data.
  6. The CloudWatch log group is permanently deleted, removing any logs it contained from the defender’s visibility.
  7. The attacker continues their malicious activities, now with reduced risk of detection due to the absence of relevant logs.

Impact

Successful deletion of CloudWatch log groups allows attackers to operate with significantly reduced visibility. This can lead to delayed incident detection and response, increased dwell time, and greater potential for data exfiltration or system compromise. The deletion of logs hampers forensic investigations, making it difficult to determine the scope and impact of the attack. In environments with strict compliance requirements, such as those governed by HIPAA or PCI DSS, this can lead to significant penalties and reputational damage.

Recommendation

  • Deploy the Sigma rule “AWS CloudWatch Log Group Deletion” to your SIEM to detect unauthorized log group deletions using eventName = DeleteLogGroup and eventSource = logs.amazonaws.com.
  • Enable AWS CloudTrail logging to capture DeleteLogGroup events within your AWS environment.
  • Investigate any detected DeleteLogGroup events, especially those not initiated from the AWS console (userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com), as potential indicators of malicious activity.
  • Implement strict IAM policies to limit the ability to delete CloudWatch log groups to only authorized personnel.
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