Assumedrole - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/assumedrole/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioTue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roleshttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-unseen-cloud-api/Tue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-unseen-cloud-api/This analytic identifies anomalous cloud API calls executed by user roles that have not previously performed those commands, potentially indicating malicious activity or unauthorized actions leading to unauthorized access or data breaches.This detection analytic identifies anomalous cloud API calls executed by user roles that haven't previously run these commands. The analytic focuses on AWS CloudTrail logs and leverages the Splunk Change data model to identify commands executed by users with the AssumedRole user type and successful status. The initial baseline search Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial is used to establish a baseline of user roles, commands, and their initial timestamps. A secondary baseline search Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update continuously updates the baseline data. The time window for evaluation is configurable through the cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window macro.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker compromises an AWS account or gains access to credentials with sts:AssumeRole permissions.
  2. The attacker assumes a role, typically one with broader permissions than their initially compromised account. This is logged as an AssumeRole event in CloudTrail.
  3. The attacker executes a series of API calls using the assumed role.
  4. The analytic detects these API calls and compares them against a baseline of previously seen API calls for the specific user role.
  5. If an API call is identified as "new" (not present in the baseline or seen within the last 24 hours), the analytic triggers.
  6. This "new" API call could be related to reconnaissance, privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or other malicious activities.
  7. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to resources, data breaches, or other detrimental outcomes within the cloud environment.

Impact

Successful exploitation of new or unmonitored commands within the cloud environment could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or other damaging outcomes. Since the ruleset relies on AWS CloudTrail data, the scope of impact is limited to AWS environments. The potential number of affected AWS instances and services varies depending on the permissions of the compromised role and the attacker's objectives.

Recommendation

  • Ensure AWS CloudTrail logging is enabled and properly configured for all AWS accounts and regions.
  • Implement the baseline searches Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial and Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update as described in the "How To Implement" section of the analytic.
  • Deploy the analytic "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles" in your Splunk environment.
  • Tune the cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window macro based on your environment's specific needs and acceptable thresholds.
  • Customize the cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter macro to exclude known-good API calls and reduce false positives.
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