Apm-Cli — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/apm-cli/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioTue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000Microsoft APM CLI Path Traversal Vulnerabilityhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-apm-cli-path-traversal/Tue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-apm-cli-path-traversal/Microsoft APM CLI version 0.8.11 and earlier are vulnerable to path traversal, allowing a malicious plugin to copy arbitrary readable host files during installation by manipulating paths in the plugin.json file.The Microsoft APM CLI is vulnerable to a path traversal vulnerability in versions 0.8.11 and earlier. This vulnerability arises during the installation of marketplace plugins, where the CLI normalizes plugins by copying components referenced in the plugin.json file. The agents, skills, commands, and hooks fields in plugin.json are attacker-controlled. However, the implementation fails to validate that these paths remain within the plugin directory. Consequently, a malicious plugin can exploit this by using absolute paths or ../ traversal paths to copy arbitrary, readable host files or directories from the installer’s machine during the apm install process. This allows attackers to stage local files into repository-controlled paths, potentially leading to the exposure of sensitive information.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker crafts a malicious APM plugin with a plugin.json file.
  2. The plugin.json file contains crafted paths within the commands field pointing to sensitive host files using absolute paths or relative path traversal (e.g., commands: "D:\\absolute\\path\\to\\victim\\secret.md" or commands: "../../../secret.md").
  3. A user executes the apm install command, referencing the malicious plugin either locally or remotely.
  4. The normalize_plugin_directory function in src/apm_cli/commands/install.py processes the plugin.
  5. The _resolve_sources() function in src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py resolves the component paths specified in plugin.json without proper validation.
  6. The APM CLI copies the files pointed to by the malicious paths into the .apm/ directory.
  7. If the copied files are recognized as prompt files (e.g., end with .prompt.md), they are integrated into the .github/prompts/ directory of the project via prompt_integrator.py.
  8. The attacker gains access to sensitive information from the copied files, which may then be committed and synced.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the victim’s machine during the installation of a malicious APM plugin. This can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, such as local notes, markdown files, source code, or configuration files. The copied files can be automatically written into .github/prompts/, increasing the likelihood that sensitive or attacker-selected content is committed, synced, or consumed by other tooling. The issue breaks the expected trust boundary that a dependency install should copy only content belonging to the dependency itself.

Recommendation

  • Deploy the “APM CLI Plugin Install Path Traversal - Absolute Path” Sigma rule to detect attempts to use absolute paths in plugin.json configurations, which can be indicative of malicious plugin activity.
  • Deploy the “APM CLI Plugin Install Path Traversal - Relative Path” Sigma rule to detect attempts to use relative paths with traversal sequences in plugin.json configurations.
  • Upgrade to a patched version of apm-cli that includes the recommended fix of resolving manifest-controlled component paths against plugin_path.resolve(), rejecting absolute or relative paths that escape the plugin root.
  • Implement file integrity monitoring on the .apm/ directory to detect unauthorized file modifications or additions, using file_event logging.
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