Api-Exploitation - CraftedSignal Threat Feed

Crawl4AI Unauthenticated SSRF in Docker API `crawl/stream` Endpoint

hello@craftedsignal.io — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 17:41:17 +0000

A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit an unpatched Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Crawl4AI Docker API server, specifically targeting versions up to 0.8.9. The vulnerability exists because the handle_stream_crawl_request function, used by POST /crawl/stream and POST /crawl with crawler_config.stream=true, fails to validate the destination of provided seed URLs. This oversight allows attackers to supply URLs pointing to internal networks, private IP addresses, or cloud-metadata endpoints (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/). The server then fetches the content from these internal resources and streams the response directly back to the attacker, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information like cloud IAM credentials or details about internal services. This critical flaw highlights a gap in the API's security checks, which was previously intended to prevent such attacks on non-streaming paths but was overlooked for streaming functionalities. The Docker API is often unauthenticated by default, increasing the attack surface.

Attack Chain

Attacker identifies an internet-facing Crawl4AI Docker API server (version <= 0.8.9).
Attacker crafts an unauthenticated POST request targeting the /crawl/stream endpoint, or the /crawl endpoint with crawler_config.stream=true.
Within the request body, the attacker includes a malicious seed URL pointing to an internal, private, or link-local address, such as http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/.
The Crawl4AI server's handle_stream_crawl_request function processes the request without applying the necessary validate_url_destination check.
The server initiates an outbound connection to the specified internal URL, fetching the content of the internal resource (e.g., cloud instance metadata).
The fetched response body (e.g., AWS IAM temporary credentials) is then streamed back by the Crawl4AI server to the unauthenticated attacker's client.
The attacker receives and extracts sensitive internal information or credentials from the streamed response.
Attacker potentially uses the obtained credentials to escalate privileges or access other internal cloud resources.

Impact

This unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) allows remote attackers to read arbitrary internal services and cloud-metadata endpoints. This can expose highly sensitive information such as cloud IAM temporary credentials (e.g., from http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/), internal network topology, or other confidential data hosted on inaccessible internal systems. The vulnerability is considered high severity due to its unauthenticated nature and direct access to internal resources, which is similar in class and impact to previously identified SSRF flaws in the project. Successful exploitation could lead to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or broader compromise of cloud environments.

Recommendation

Upgrade Crawl4AI instances to version 0.9.0 or later to patch the SSRF vulnerability.
Enable authentication on the Crawl4AI Docker API and restrict access to authorized users/systems only.
Implement egress filtering or network segmentation to restrict outbound network access from Crawl4AI containers, preventing connections to internal or metadata service IP ranges like 169.254.169.254.
Deploy the provided Sigma rules to your SIEM to detect attempts at exploiting the /crawl/stream or /crawl (with crawler_config.stream=true) endpoints with internal IP addresses.
Ensure webserver access logs are enabled and ingested into your SIEM for the Crawl4AI application to allow detection of malicious POST requests targeting /crawl/stream or /crawl.

PraisonAI Authentication Bypass via PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled

hello@craftedsignal.io — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:55:58 +0000

A critical authentication bypass exists in PraisonAI, affecting versions prior to 4.6.61. The vulnerability stems from an undocumented "feature" where setting the PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable completely deactivates authentication for the /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke endpoint. This misconfiguration is highly likely to be present in production Docker and Docker Compose deployments due to the application's own error messages explicitly advertising this bypass as a convenience option. Attackers can leverage this to gain full unauthenticated access to agent invocation functionalities, enabling them to trigger any registered agent and potentially execute arbitrary actions depending on the agent's configured tools, leading to severe compromise of the host system or connected services.

Attack Chain

Reconnaissance: An attacker identifies an internet-facing PraisonAI instance, typically deployed via Docker or Docker Compose.
Vulnerability Identification: The attacker attempts to interact with the /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke endpoint without authentication, potentially observing error messages that suggest setting PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to bypass auth, confirming the misconfiguration.
Unauthenticated API Call: The attacker constructs a POST request to /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke with a malicious payload, targeting a known or guessed agent ID, and sends it to the vulnerable PraisonAI instance without providing any authentication credentials.
Agent Triggering: Due to the PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled setting, the PraisonAI server bypasses all authentication checks and processes the unauthenticated request, triggering the specified agent.
Execution via Agent Tools: The activated agent, configured with specific tools (e.g., shell access, Python interpreter, API keys), executes arbitrary actions as dictated by the attacker's payload injected via the invoke endpoint.
Impact: This unauthenticated execution leads to consequences such as data exfiltration, remote code execution, system compromise, or further lateral movement within the compromised environment.

Impact

The primary impact of this vulnerability is full unauthenticated access to the PraisonAI agent invocation API. If exploited, an attacker can trigger any registered agent on the server without needing valid credentials. This means that if an agent has been configured with access to sensitive systems or functionalities (e.g., shell command execution, database access, cloud API keys), the attacker can leverage these capabilities to execute arbitrary actions. This can result in data exfiltration, privilege escalation, remote code execution, or complete compromise of the underlying server and connected resources. The ease of exploitation and potential for severe consequences makes this a critical security concern for organizations running affected PraisonAI versions.

Recommendation

Immediately update PraisonAI instances to version 4.6.61 or newer to remediate the vulnerability.
Review all Dockerfiles, Docker Compose configurations, and environment variable settings for PraisonAI deployments to ensure PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is not present, or is explicitly set to enabled.
Deploy the provided Detect PraisonAI Unauthenticated Agent Invocation Sigma rule to your SIEM to monitor for exploitation attempts against the /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke endpoint.
Deploy the provided Detect PraisonAI PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled Misconfiguration Sigma rule to your EDR/SIEM to identify systems misconfigured with the vulnerable environment variable.
Implement strict network access controls to limit access to PraisonAI instances, particularly the /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke API endpoint, to only trusted internal networks or specific services.