Allowlist - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/tags/allowlist/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 17 Jan 2024 18:00:00 +0000OpenClaw Unauthorized Channel Allowlist Modification via chat.sendhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-17-openclaw-privilege-escalation/Wed, 17 Jan 2024 18:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-17-openclaw-privilege-escalation/A vulnerability in OpenClaw versions 2026.3.23 and earlier allows a gateway client with `operator.write` scope to bypass intended privilege separation and persist channel authorization policy.OpenClaw versions 2026.3.23 and earlier contain a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows an attacker with operator.write scope to modify channel authorization policies that should be restricted to operator.admin scope. This occurs due to a missing sink-side check on the /allowlist command when called internally through the chat.send function. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to widen DM or group allowlists for channels, bypassing intended authorization controls. The vulnerability was patched in OpenClaw version 2026.3.24, which is the current shipping release. This bypass weakens the documented control-plane privilege split between write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker authenticates to the OpenClaw gateway with operator.write scope.
  2. The attacker sends a message via the chat.send API.
  3. chat.send builds an internal message context with CommandAuthorized: true and includes GatewayClientScopes.
  4. resolveCommandAuthorization(...) translates this into isAuthorizedSender=true because no stricter override is present.
  5. The attacker uses the /allowlist add|remove command within the chat.send message content.
  6. The /allowlist handler clones the parsed config and calls plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...).
  7. The handler validates the result and attempts to persist it with writeConfigFile(validated.config).
  8. Due to the missing operator.admin check before the write occurs, the configuration is updated, widening the DM or group allowlists for the targeted channel.

Impact

A gateway client limited to operator.write can persist first-party channel authorization policy, which should require operator.admin. This allows the attacker to widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the /allowlist functionality. Successfully exploiting this vulnerability weakens the security posture of the OpenClaw gateway by undermining the intended access control mechanisms. Attackers can potentially read private communications.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.3.24 or later to patch the vulnerability (reference: GitHub advisory).
  • Monitor gateway logs for the use of /allowlist add or /allowlist remove commands originating from operator.write-scoped clients (reference: Attack Chain).
  • Implement rate limiting on the chat.send API to mitigate potential abuse (reference: Attack Chain).
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