{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/wireguard/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["Elastic Defend","Microsoft Defender XDR","WireGuard"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["privilege-escalation","uac-bypass","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft","Elastic"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) on Windows systems using the ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface. Attackers exploit this interface to execute code with elevated privileges without requiring user interaction, effectively bypassing UAC\u0026rsquo;s security mechanisms. This can lead to stealthy execution of malicious code and privilege escalation, granting attackers greater control over the compromised system. The technique is documented in tools such as UACME. The rule is designed to detect this specific bypass by monitoring process creations with specific parent-child relationships and command-line arguments associated with the ICMLuaUtil COM interface. This technique has been observed across various attack scenarios, making it a significant threat to Windows environments.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn initial process is executed, often by the user, without elevated privileges.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThis process initiates a COM object, specifically targeting the ICMLuaUtil interface.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003edllhost.exe\u003c/code\u003e is spawned as a parent process, hosting the COM object.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003edllhost.exe\u003c/code\u003e is executed with specific \u003ccode\u003e/Processid\u003c/code\u003e arguments, either \u003ccode\u003e{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003e{D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937}\u003c/code\u003e, which correspond to the ICMLuaUtil interface.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA child process is launched by \u003ccode\u003edllhost.exe\u003c/code\u003e, inheriting elevated privileges. This process is often a script interpreter or another executable capable of running arbitrary code.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe launched process executes malicious commands or code, taking advantage of the elevated privileges to perform actions such as installing malware, modifying system settings, or accessing sensitive data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker gains persistence through the elevated process or by creating new scheduled tasks or services.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe system is compromised, and the attacker has achieved privilege escalation, allowing them to perform nearly any action on the system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of this UAC bypass technique allows attackers to gain elevated privileges on compromised Windows systems. This can lead to the installation of malware, exfiltration of sensitive data, modification of system settings, and complete control over the affected system. Depending on the context of the user\u0026rsquo;s account, lateral movement may be possible to other systems.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface\u0026rdquo; to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect potential UAC bypass attempts.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging (Event ID 1) to provide the necessary data for the Sigma rule to function correctly, as specified in the rule\u0026rsquo;s setup instructions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any alerts generated by the Sigma rule, focusing on the parent process, child process, and command-line arguments to determine if the activity is legitimate or malicious, using the triage steps outlined in the rule\u0026rsquo;s \u0026rsquo;note\u0026rsquo; section.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eConsider implementing application control solutions, such as Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker, to restrict the execution of unauthorized applications, as mentioned in the post-incident hardening recommendations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and minimize local administrator group membership to reduce the attack surface for UAC bypass techniques.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-05-12T19:10:04Z","date_published":"2026-05-12T19:10:04Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-uac-bypass-icmluautil/","summary":"Detects User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface, where attackers may attempt to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions, potentially leading to privilege escalation.","title":"UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-uac-bypass-icmluautil/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — WireGuard","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}