<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>WireGuard (Subsys/Net/Lib/Wireguard/Wg.c) - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/wireguard-subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 22:04:43 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/wireguard-subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>WireGuard: Peer endpoint hijacking via unauthenticated UDP packets (CVE-2026-79977)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-wireguard-endpoint-hijack/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 22:04:43 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-wireguard-endpoint-hijack/</guid><description>A vulnerability in the WireGuard implementation (subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c) allows an off-path attacker to redirect peer traffic by sending an unauthenticated UDP datagram.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The WireGuard implementation in <code>subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c</code> updates the peer endpoint from an unauthenticated transport-data message. In <code>handle_transport_data()</code>, if the 32-bit receiver index of an incoming message does not match a session, the code copies the datagram's source address into <code>peer-&gt;endpoint</code> using <code>memcpy</code>. Because the receiver index is unknown and unverified, an attacker can supply an arbitrary address.</p>
<p>The listener, which defaults to UDP port 51820, does not filter by remote address or cryptographic identity, allowing any host capable of sending a UDP datagram to trigger this update if the peer lacks a valid handshake or current keypair. This redirects subsequent handshake initiations, keepalives, and encrypted data to the attacker-supplied address, causing a loss of availability and potential man-in-the-middle positioning. End-to-end cryptography prevents decryption or forgery of tunnel content. <code>CONFIG_WIREGUARD</code> is experimental and not enabled by default.</p>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category></item></channel></rss>