https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/winword.exe/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioMon, 04 May 2026 14:17:05 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-dll-side-loading/Mon, 04 May 2026 14:17:05 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-dll-side-loading/This rule detects potential DLL side-loading attempts by identifying instances of Windows trusted programs (WinWord.exe, EXPLORER.EXE, w3wp.exe, DISM.EXE) being started after being renamed or from a non-standard path, which is a common technique to evade defenses by side-loading a malicious DLL into the memory space of a trusted process.This detection rule identifies instances of Windows trusted programs such as WinWord.exe, EXPLORER.EXE, w3wp.exe, and DISM.EXE executing from unusual paths or after being renamed, which may indicate DLL side-loading. DLL side-loading is a defense evasion technique where a malicious DLL is placed in the same directory as a legitimate executable. When the executable runs, it may load the malicious DLL instead of the legitimate one, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of the trusted process. The detection logic focuses on process executions that deviate from standard installation paths. The targeted processes are commonly used and often whitelisted, making this a potent technique for adversaries to bypass security controls.

Attack Chain

1. The attacker gains initial access to the system (e.g., through phishing or exploitation of a vulnerability).
2. The attacker identifies a trusted Windows program vulnerable to DLL side-loading (WinWord.exe, EXPLORER.EXE, w3wp.exe, or DISM.EXE).
3. The attacker drops a malicious DLL into a directory where the trusted program is expected to load DLLs from, often alongside a renamed or copied version of the legitimate executable.
4. Alternatively, the attacker renames the trusted program and places it in a non-standard path.
5. The attacker executes the renamed or moved trusted program from the non-standard path.
6. The trusted program loads the malicious DLL due to DLL search order hijacking.
7. The malicious DLL executes arbitrary code within the context of the trusted process.
8. The attacker achieves persistence, elevates privileges, or performs other malicious activities, potentially evading detection due to the trusted process context.

Impact

A successful DLL side-loading attack allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of a trusted Microsoft process. This can lead to privilege escalation, persistence, and further compromise of the system. Since the malicious code is running within a trusted process, it can bypass application whitelisting and other security controls, making it difficult to detect. This can lead to data theft, system disruption, or the installation of malware.

Recommendation

• Deploy the Sigma rule “Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs” to your SIEM to detect suspicious executions of trusted programs from non-standard paths or with modifications.
• Enable Sysmon process creation logging (Event ID 1) to provide the necessary data for the Sigma rule to function correctly.
• Review and tune the exclusion paths in the Sigma rule to avoid false positives from legitimate software updates, custom enterprise applications, or virtual environments.
• Monitor process execution paths using the Sigma rule “Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs” and investigate any deviations from standard installation paths.

]]>mediumadvisorydefense-evasionexecutiondll-side-loadingwindowshttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-suspicious-wmi-image-load/Tue, 09 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-suspicious-wmi-image-load/Adversaries may exploit Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute code stealthily, bypassing traditional security measures by loading `wmiutils.dll` from Microsoft Office applications, potentially indicating malicious execution.This detection rule identifies suspicious image loading of wmiutils.dll from Microsoft Office processes (WINWORD.EXE, EXCEL.EXE, POWERPNT.EXE, MSPUB.EXE, MSACCESS.EXE). Adversaries can use this technique to execute code and evade traditional parent/child processes spawned from Microsoft Office products. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where child processes are spawned via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).

Attack Chain

1. User opens a malicious Microsoft Office document (e.g., Word, Excel).
2. The document contains a macro or exploit that triggers the execution of WMI commands.
3. The Office application spawns a WMI process or utilizes existing WMI infrastructure.
4. The WMI process loads the wmiutils.dll library, which is unusual for normal Office operations.
5. The WMI commands execute malicious code, potentially downloading or executing further payloads.
6. The attacker establishes persistence through WMI event subscriptions or other methods.
7. The attacker performs lateral movement using WMI to execute commands on other systems.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, and move laterally within the network, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or ransomware deployment. While the number of victims is unknown, this technique can be used in targeted attacks against organizations that heavily rely on Microsoft Office applications.

Recommendation

• Deploy the Sigma rule “Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office” to your SIEM and tune for your environment.
• Enable Sysmon event ID 7 (Image Loaded) logging for comprehensive image load monitoring as suggested in the setup instructions.
• Monitor process creation events for Microsoft Office applications spawning WMI-related processes (e.g., wbemtest.exe, wmic.exe) to detect potential WMI abuse.
• Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement in case of a successful WMI-based attack.

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