{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/winword.exe/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["WinWord.exe","EXPLORER.EXE","w3wp.exe","DISM.EXE","Microsoft Defender XDR"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["defense-evasion","execution","dll-side-loading","windows"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies instances of Windows trusted programs such as WinWord.exe, EXPLORER.EXE, w3wp.exe, and DISM.EXE executing from unusual paths or after being renamed, which may indicate DLL side-loading. DLL side-loading is a defense evasion technique where a malicious DLL is placed in the same directory as a legitimate executable. When the executable runs, it may load the malicious DLL instead of the legitimate one, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of the trusted process. The detection logic focuses on process executions that deviate from standard installation paths. The targeted processes are commonly used and often whitelisted, making this a potent technique for adversaries to bypass security controls.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker gains initial access to the system (e.g., through phishing or exploitation of a vulnerability).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker identifies a trusted Windows program vulnerable to DLL side-loading (WinWord.exe, EXPLORER.EXE, w3wp.exe, or DISM.EXE).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker drops a malicious DLL into a directory where the trusted program is expected to load DLLs from, often alongside a renamed or copied version of the legitimate executable.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAlternatively, the attacker renames the trusted program and places it in a non-standard path.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker executes the renamed or moved trusted program from the non-standard path.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe trusted program loads the malicious DLL due to DLL search order hijacking.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe malicious DLL executes arbitrary code within the context of the trusted process.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker achieves persistence, elevates privileges, or performs other malicious activities, potentially evading detection due to the trusted process context.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful DLL side-loading attack allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of a trusted Microsoft process. This can lead to privilege escalation, persistence, and further compromise of the system. Since the malicious code is running within a trusted process, it can bypass application whitelisting and other security controls, making it difficult to detect. This can lead to data theft, system disruption, or the installation of malware.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs\u0026rdquo; to your SIEM to detect suspicious executions of trusted programs from non-standard paths or with modifications.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process creation logging (Event ID 1) to provide the necessary data for the Sigma rule to function correctly.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and tune the exclusion paths in the Sigma rule to avoid false positives from legitimate software updates, custom enterprise applications, or virtual environments.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor process execution paths using the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs\u0026rdquo; and investigate any deviations from standard installation paths.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-05-04T14:17:05Z","date_published":"2026-05-04T14:17:05Z","id":"/briefs/2026-05-dll-side-loading/","summary":"This rule detects potential DLL side-loading attempts by identifying instances of Windows trusted programs (WinWord.exe, EXPLORER.EXE, w3wp.exe, DISM.EXE) being started after being renamed or from a non-standard path, which is a common technique to evade defenses by side-loading a malicious DLL into the memory space of a trusted process.","title":"Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-dll-side-loading/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["WINWORD.EXE","EXCEL.EXE","POWERPNT.EXE","MSPUB.EXE","MSACCESS.EXE"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["wmi","image load","office","execution"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies suspicious image loading of \u003ccode\u003ewmiutils.dll\u003c/code\u003e from Microsoft Office processes (WINWORD.EXE, EXCEL.EXE, POWERPNT.EXE, MSPUB.EXE, MSACCESS.EXE). Adversaries can use this technique to execute code and evade traditional parent/child processes spawned from Microsoft Office products. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where child processes are spawned via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUser opens a malicious Microsoft Office document (e.g., Word, Excel).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe document contains a macro or exploit that triggers the execution of WMI commands.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Office application spawns a WMI process or utilizes existing WMI infrastructure.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe WMI process loads the \u003ccode\u003ewmiutils.dll\u003c/code\u003e library, which is unusual for normal Office operations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe WMI commands execute malicious code, potentially downloading or executing further payloads.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker establishes persistence through WMI event subscriptions or other methods.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker performs lateral movement using WMI to execute commands on other systems.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, and move laterally within the network, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or ransomware deployment. While the number of victims is unknown, this technique can be used in targeted attacks against organizations that heavily rely on Microsoft Office applications.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office\u0026rdquo; to your SIEM and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon event ID 7 (Image Loaded) logging for comprehensive image load monitoring as suggested in the \u003ca href=\"https://ela.st/sysmon-event-7-setup\"\u003esetup instructions\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor process creation events for Microsoft Office applications spawning WMI-related processes (e.g., \u003ccode\u003ewbemtest.exe\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ewmic.exe\u003c/code\u003e) to detect potential WMI abuse.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement network segmentation to limit lateral movement in case of a successful WMI-based attack.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-09T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-09T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-suspicious-wmi-image-load/","summary":"Adversaries may exploit Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute code stealthily, bypassing traditional security measures by loading `wmiutils.dll` from Microsoft Office applications, potentially indicating malicious execution.","title":"Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-suspicious-wmi-image-load/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — WINWORD.EXE","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}