{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","favicon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.png","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/vibe-trading-v0.1.6-and-earlier/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","icon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/apple-touch-icon.png","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["Vibe-Trading (v0.1.6 and earlier)"],"_cs_severities":["critical"],"_cs_tags":[],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["HKUDS"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eVibe-Trading v0.1.6 and earlier versions are affected by several critical security flaws stemming from insecure default configurations. The application defaults to an unauthenticated state where the \u003ccode\u003eAPI_AUTH_KEY\u003c/code\u003e environment variable remains unset, causing the \u003ccode\u003erequire_auth()\u003c/code\u003e dependency in FastAPI to return immediately without enforcing access controls. Because the application runs as root within a Docker container, this exposure provides an unauthenticated attacker with the ability to execute arbitrary shell commands via the BashTool functionality, resulting in full container takeover.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBeyond RCE, the application suffers from broken authorization on read-only endpoints, which remain accessible even when \u003ccode\u003eAPI_AUTH_KEY\u003c/code\u003e is configured. Additional vulnerabilities include an unrestricted file upload mechanism that allows attackers to write scripts (e.g., .py, .sh) to known paths, and a permissive CORS configuration that permits cross-origin requests from any local machine-served web application. These vulnerabilities, combined with the application's reliance on LLM tool-calling, present a high risk for data exfiltration and persistent malicious activity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker performs discovery against an exposed Vibe-Trading instance on TCP port 8899.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker confirms the lack of authentication by executing a POST request to \u003ccode\u003e/sessions\u003c/code\u003e without an \u003ccode\u003eAuthorization\u003c/code\u003e header.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker uses the \u003ccode\u003e/sessions\u003c/code\u003e endpoint to create a new session and obtain a \u003ccode\u003esession_id\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker submits a crafted message to \u003ccode\u003e/sessions/{session_id}/messages\u003c/code\u003e containing a natural language prompt designed to trigger the BashTool.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe ReAct agent selects \u003ccode\u003eBashTool\u003c/code\u003e, which executes \u003ccode\u003esubprocess.run(command, shell=True)\u003c/code\u003e using the attacker-supplied input.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe command executes as root (UID 0) within the container environment, granting the attacker arbitrary code execution.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker uses the RCE primitive to exfiltrate sensitive environment variables, LLM API keys, or broker tokens stored in the container memory or file system.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation leads to full container takeover and potential compromise of the host environment if proper container isolation is missing. An attacker can exfiltrate sensitive data, including LLM API keys and broker credentials used for automated trading. Given the application's functionality, this can result in unauthorized financial transactions or persistent access to the victim's trading accounts. The vulnerabilities affect all instances deployed with default settings using the provided \u003ccode\u003edocker-compose.yml\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePrioritize the immediate securing of all Vibe-Trading instances by enforcing authentication.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSet a strong \u003ccode\u003eAPI_AUTH_KEY\u003c/code\u003e in the environment configuration and ensure the application is restarted with the new settings.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement a \u003ccode\u003eUSER\u003c/code\u003e directive in the \u003ccode\u003eDockerfile\u003c/code\u003e to drop privileges from root to a non-privileged user.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRestrict network access to the API server to trusted source IP addresses using firewall rules or container network policies.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBlock or monitor all HTTP requests to the \u003ccode\u003e/upload\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e/sessions\u003c/code\u003e endpoints that lack valid \u003ccode\u003eAuthorization\u003c/code\u003e headers.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-10-02T22:49:29Z","date_published":"2026-10-02T22:49:29Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-vibe-trading-rce/","summary":"Vibe-Trading v0.1.6 contains multiple critical vulnerabilities, including unauthenticated API access, unrestricted file uploads, and a command injection chain leading to container-level RCE when the API_AUTH_KEY is unset.","title":"Vibe-Trading Unauthenticated RCE and API Exposure","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-vibe-trading-rce/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Vibe-Trading (V0.1.6 and Earlier)","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}