Trigger.dev (3.3.8 - 4.5.5) - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/trigger.dev-3.3.8---4.5.5/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioFri, 14 Aug 2026 02:03:29 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.pngCraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/3232https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svgPrototype Pollution in Trigger.dev Run Metadata APIhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-trigger-dev-prototype-pollution/Fri, 14 Aug 2026 02:03:29 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-trigger-dev-prototype-pollution/An unauthenticated-accessible prototype pollution vulnerability in the Trigger.dev metadata API allows low-privileged attackers to corrupt the global object, leading to cross-tenant denial of service and process crashes via CVE-2026-73654.Trigger.dev versions 3.3.8 through 4.5.5 are vulnerable to prototype pollution via the PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the application passes attacker-controlled operation.key inputs directly into the JSONHeroPath.set() method without sanitization. This allows an attacker possessing a valid environment API key to inject properties into Object.prototype, which is inherited by all objects in the webapp process. Because Trigger.dev operates as a multi-tenant web application, this pollution corrupts internal state across tenants, including Prisma query objects and Prometheus metrics. The contamination results in authentication failures for other tenants and triggers uncaught exceptions that cause the entire webapp process to crash, enabling a persistent denial-of-service attack.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker authenticates to the Trigger.dev instance using a standard, low-privileged environment API key.
  2. Attacker crafts a malicious PUT request to the /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata endpoint.
  3. The request body includes an operation.key value set to $.__proto__.polluted (or similar prototype path).
  4. The applyMetadataOperations() function in packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts receives the untrusted key.
  5. JSONHeroPath processes the key and executes .set() on the newMetadata object, inadvertently writing to Object.prototype.
  6. Global process state is corrupted; subsequent database queries (e.g., via Prisma) fail because they now inherit unexpected properties.
  7. Third-party libraries (e.g., Prometheus prom-client) encounter validation errors due to the polluted object structure, causing an uncaughtException.
  8. The webapp process crashes, resulting in service denial for all tenants, repeating upon subsequent requests (crash-loop).

Impact

The vulnerability enables a complete cross-tenant denial of service. A single authenticated request can crash the entire webapp process. Beyond availability, the ability to pollute Object.prototype serves as a primitive for further exploitation, such as logic or authentication bypasses, depending on the gadgets present in the runtime environment.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade Trigger.dev instances immediately to version 4.5.6 or later to include the prototype pollution guards.
  • Audit existing logs for anomalous PUT requests to the metadata API containing suspicious path segments like __proto__, constructor, or prototype.
  • Ensure that any custom middleware or API extensions for metadata processing use Object.create(null) for storage and implement strict allow-listing for JSON path keys.
  • Implement request schema validation to strictly enforce expected character sets and patterns for API metadata keys.
]]>highadvisoryprototype-pollutionrcevulnerabilitywebserver