<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Toml (&lt;= 5.0.0) - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/toml--5.0.0/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 06:44:24 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/toml--5.0.0/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>toml: Prototype pollution via ambiguous TOML key paths (CVE-2026-114142)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-toml-node-prototype-pollution/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 06:44:24 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-toml-node-prototype-pollution/</guid><description>The toml package is vulnerable to prototype pollution, allowing unauthorized injection of properties into Object.prototype via maliciously crafted TOML documents.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The toml package (up to and including version 5.0.0) is susceptible to prototype pollution. The vulnerability arises from ambiguous key-path encoding where <code>quoteDottedString()</code> fails to escape double quotes, leading to path desynchronization. Combined with a table-array header that can clear security guards and a lack of <code>isOwnedContainer</code> checks during the <code>assign()</code> descent, an attacker can traverse into an object's prototype chain. Successfully crafting a specific TOML document allows for the injection of arbitrary properties into <code>Object.prototype</code>, which then become visible to every object in the Node.js process.</p>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>prototype-pollution</category><category>nodejs</category></item></channel></rss>