ToDesk.app — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/todesk.app/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioMon, 11 May 2026 16:08:41 +0000Suspicious macOS MS Office Child Processhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-suspicious-office-child-macos/Mon, 11 May 2026 16:08:41 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-suspicious-office-child-macos/This rule identifies suspicious child processes of Microsoft Office applications on macOS, which often result from exploitation or malicious macros, by detecting unexpected processes like curl, bash, osascript, and python spawned by Office apps, while filtering out false positives related to product version discovery, error reporting, and legitimate software.This detection rule identifies suspicious child processes spawned by Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, Excel, Outlook, and OneNote) on macOS systems. Attackers often exploit Office applications through malicious macros or document vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code. This technique allows them to gain an initial foothold on the system. The rule focuses on detecting the execution of scripting languages and system utilities such as curl, bash, osascript, and python as child processes of Office applications, indicating potential malicious activity. The rule logic incorporates filters to reduce false positives related to legitimate software behavior and system administration tasks. The rule was last updated on 2026/05/07 and requires Elastic Defend for data collection.

Attack Chain

  1. A user opens a malicious document (e.g., Word, Excel) received via spearphishing (T1566.001).
  2. The document contains a malicious macro or exploits a vulnerability in the Office application (T1203, T1204.002).
  3. Upon execution, the macro or exploit triggers the Office application to execute a shell command (T1059.004).
  4. The shell command executes a scripting interpreter like /bin/bash or /usr/bin/python to run malicious code (T1059.004, T1059.006).
  5. The malicious code downloads additional payloads or executes system commands using utilities like curl or osascript.
  6. The attacker gains initial access to the system and can perform further actions such as reconnaissance or persistence.
  7. The attacker may use plutil or PlistBuddy to modify system configuration files.
  8. The attacker may use xattr to remove file quarantine attributes.

Impact

Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary code execution, allowing attackers to install malware, steal sensitive information, or perform other malicious activities. The targeted applications are widely used in enterprise environments, making this a potentially high-impact threat. Although the rule does not specify the number of affected organizations or incidents, the widespread use of Microsoft Office applications on macOS means many systems are potentially at risk.

Recommendation

  • Deploy the provided EQL rule to your Elastic Security environment to detect suspicious child processes of MS Office applications on macOS (rule).
  • Enable Elastic Defend with the “Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)” configuration setting to ensure required data is collected (setup).
  • Review and tune the rule’s filter conditions based on your organization’s environment to minimize false positives, paying attention to the processes and arguments listed in the rule query (query).
  • Implement application control policies to restrict the execution of unauthorized scripting languages and utilities to prevent exploitation through Office applications (rule).
  • Educate users about the risks of opening suspicious attachments and enabling macros in Office documents (T1566.001, T1204.002).
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