<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>SMF — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/smf/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 22:47:24 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/smf/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>free5GC SMF Unauthenticated Process-Kill Denial-of-Service via UPI Endpoint</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-free5gc-smf-dos/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 22:47:24 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-free5gc-smf-dos/</guid><description>free5GC's SMF is vulnerable to an unauthenticated denial-of-service attack where a crafted POST request to the `/upi/v1/upNodesLinks` endpoint can trigger a `Fatalf` call, terminating the entire SMF process, effectively disrupting network services.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The free5GC Session Management Function (SMF) is susceptible to a denial-of-service attack due to missing authentication on the <code>UPI</code> management route group. Specifically, the <code>POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks</code> endpoint lacks proper inbound OAuth2 middleware, allowing unauthenticated requests. An attacker can send a crafted JSON payload to this endpoint, which is then processed by <code>UpNodesFromConfiguration()</code>. Certain validation failures, such as overlapping UE-IP-pools, trigger a <code>logger.InitLog.Fatalf(...)</code> call, which terminates the entire SMF process. This is more severe than a simple panic, as <code>Fatalf</code> is equivalent to <code>os.Exit(1)</code> and halts the entire SMF process, impacting PDU-session establishment and UE policy lookups. The vulnerability affects free5GC version 4.2.1.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>The attacker identifies the vulnerable <code>POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks</code> endpoint on the SMF SBI (Service Based Interface), typically running on port 8000.</li>
<li>The attacker crafts a malicious JSON payload containing UPF (User Plane Function) configuration data.</li>
<li>The crafted JSON includes a UE-IP-pool that overlaps with an existing UPF&rsquo;s pool (e.g., <code>10.60.0.0/16</code>).</li>
<li>The attacker sends an unauthenticated POST request to the <code>/upi/v1/upNodesLinks</code> endpoint with the malicious JSON payload.</li>
<li>The SMF processes the request and passes the JSON data to the <code>UpNodesFromConfiguration()</code> function.</li>
<li>The <code>UpNodesFromConfiguration()</code> function calls <code>isOverlap(allUEIPPools)</code> to validate the UE-IP-pools.</li>
<li>The <code>isOverlap</code> function detects the overlapping CIDR value between the attacker-provided UPF and the existing UPF configuration.</li>
<li>The <code>isOverlap</code> function triggers a <code>logger.InitLog.Fatalf(&quot;overlap cidr value between UPFs&quot;)</code> call, which terminates the entire SMF process due to the equivalent of <code>os.Exit(1)</code>.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a complete denial-of-service on the free5GC SMF. The attacker only needs network access to the SMF SBI and can repeatedly send the malicious POST request to keep the SMF process terminated after each restart. This impacts all SMF services, including PDU-session establishment and UE policy interactions, leading to network connectivity disruptions. This vulnerability affects free5GC v4.2.1.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Apply the official patch from the upstream fix at <a href="https://github.com/free5gc/smf/pull/203">https://github.com/free5gc/smf/pull/203</a> to mitigate CVE-2026-44321.</li>
<li>Implement network access controls to restrict access to the SMF SBI from untrusted networks.</li>
<li>Deploy the Sigma rule <code>Detect Free5GC SMF UPI POST UPF Configuration</code> to detect suspicious POST requests to the <code>/upi/v1/upNodesLinks</code> endpoint.</li>
<li>Monitor SMF container logs for the <code>FATA</code> message <code>overlap cidr value between UPFs</code> indicating a process termination.</li>
<li>Consider using the <code>webserver</code> Sigma rules in this brief to detect unauthorized requests to the <code>/upi/v1/upNodesLinks</code> endpoint.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">medium</category><category domain="type">threat</category><category>free5GC</category><category>SMF</category><category>DoS</category><category>unauthenticated</category><category>UPI</category><category>CVE-2026-44321</category></item></channel></rss>