Siyuan — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/siyuan/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 22 Apr 2026 20:55:31 +0000SiYuan Path Traversal via Double URL Encoding in `/export/` Endpointhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-siyuan-path-traversal/Wed, 22 Apr 2026 20:55:31 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-siyuan-path-traversal/SiYuan is vulnerable to path traversal via double URL encoding in the `/export/` endpoint, bypassing an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-30869; an authenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to traverse directories and read arbitrary workspace files, including the SQLite database (`siyuan.db`), kernel log, and user documents due to a redundant `url.PathUnescape()` call in `serveExport()`.SiYuan is vulnerable to a path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2026-30869) due to a redundant url.PathUnescape() call within the serveExport() function. The vulnerability exists in versions prior to 3.6.5. This flaw allows an authenticated attacker, including low-privilege users with Publish/Reader roles, to bypass intended security restrictions and access sensitive files stored within the SiYuan workspace. The initial fix attempted with IsSensitivePath() proved insufficient as it did not address the core issue of double URL decoding. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by using double URL encoded characters in a crafted HTTP request, allowing them to read arbitrary files such as the complete SQLite document database (siyuan.db), kernel logs, and other critical files.

Attack Chain

  1. An authenticated attacker sends a GET request to the /export/ endpoint with a double URL encoded path, such as /export/%252e%252e/siyuan.db.
  2. The Go HTTP server decodes the initial layer of URL encoding, transforming %25 into %, resulting in a path like /export/%2e%2e/siyuan.db.
  3. The path cleaner does not recognize %2e%2e as directory traversal, so it passes through.
  4. The serveExport() function then calls url.PathUnescape() on the path, decoding %2e%2e into ...
  5. The filepath.Join() function concatenates the exportBaseDir with the now decoded path, e.g., <workspace>/../siyuan.db.
  6. The IsSensitivePath() check fails to block the request because it doesn’t account for the decoded path or specific database files in the temp/ directory.
  7. The attacker successfully retrieves the contents of the siyuan.db file, which contains the complete document database.
  8. The attacker repeats the process to access other sensitive files within the workspace, such as siyuan.log, blocktree.db, and asset_content.db.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to exfiltrate sensitive data, including the entire SQLite document database, potentially containing all user documents, attributes, and search indexes. The attacker can also access the kernel log, which may contain internal server paths, versions, configuration details, and error messages. This information disclosure could lead to further compromise of the system. While the number of victims is unknown, any SiYuan instance running a version prior to 3.6.5 is potentially vulnerable.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade SiYuan to version 3.6.5 or later to remediate the vulnerability.
  • Deploy the provided Sigma rule Detect SiYuan Path Traversal Attempt to detect attempts to exploit this vulnerability by monitoring for double URL encoded characters in requests to the /export/ endpoint.
  • Monitor web server logs for requests to the /export/ endpoint containing %252e%252e to identify potential exploitation attempts.
  • Consider implementing a more robust path validation mechanism within the serveExport() function that properly handles URL decoding and directory traversal attempts.
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