By providing specifically crafted values, an attacker can force the application to perform reads past the boundary of the 262144-byte receive buffer. This operation triggers an IndexOutOfRangeException. Because the library handles this exception using a generic catch block that breaks the receive loop rather than a recoverable handler, the dedicated SCTP receive thread is terminated and fails to restart. This results in the immediate and permanent loss of the SCTP association and all associated WebRTC data channels.

Attack Chain

1. An attacker establishes a post-DTLS negotiated WebRTC connection with a target running a vulnerable SIPSorcery version.
2. The attacker constructs a malicious SCTP packet containing a SACK chunk (type 3).
3. The attacker sets the chunkLength to a valid value (e.g., 16) to pass initial SctpPacket.ParseChunks sanity checks.
4. The attacker sets numGapAckBlocks to 0xFFFF, forcing the parser into an oversized iteration loop.
5. The attacker computes a valid CRC32C checksum to bypass the network-level verification stage of the SCTP packet.
6. The SIPSorcery library reads the crafted count into the gap-ack processing loop within SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk.
7. The loop accesses index 262144 of the 262144-byte buffer, triggering an IndexOutOfRangeException.
8. The exception propagates to the generic catch block in RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive, which executes a break statement and permanently terminates the receive thread.

Impact

The vulnerability results in a complete and permanent denial of service for any affected SCTP association. All data channels associated with the connection are dropped and the service cannot recover without a manual restart of the impacted thread or service, depending on implementation. This impacts all applications utilizing SIPSorcery for WebRTC transport.

Recommendation

Detection and mitigation should focus on identifying malformed SCTP traffic or application-level thread stability.

• Update SIPSorcery to a patched version that implements bounds checking for numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs.
• Implement application-level monitoring for the termination of the _receiveThread in RTCSctpTransport.
• If patching is not immediate, deploy network security controls to inspect and drop SCTP packets with suspicious chunk parameters if the environment supports deep packet inspection for WebRTC protocols.