<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Simple-Git (3.15.0 - 4.0.0) - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/simple-git-3.15.0---4.0.0/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:42:03 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/simple-git-3.15.0---4.0.0/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>Remote Code Execution via simple-git trailer.cmd Configuration</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-simple-git-vulnerability/</link><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:42:03 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-simple-git-vulnerability/</guid><description>The simple-git library fails to block 'trailer.&lt;token&gt;.cmd' configuration in its unsafe-operation guard, enabling command injection when applications process untrusted user input.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <code>simple-git</code> library (versions 3.15.0 through 3.36.0) contains a vulnerability in its <code>blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin</code> that fails to classify <code>trailer.&lt;token&gt;.cmd</code> as a dangerous Git configuration option. Git supports trailer commands to dynamically generate or modify metadata during operations like <code>git interpret-trailers</code>. Because <code>simple-git</code> does not include this key in its <code>preventUnsafeConfig</code> blocklist, an application that allows untrusted user input to influence Git configuration (e.g., via <code>SimpleGitOptions.config</code> or inline <code>-c</code> arguments) can be coerced into executing arbitrary shell commands. When the <code>git</code> binary is invoked with these attacker-controlled trailers, it executes the specified command with the permissions and environment of the Node.js process. This affects applications that bridge user-supplied data to <code>simple-git</code> configuration parameters without strict validation.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Attacker identifies an application endpoint or input field that passes user-controlled strings into <code>simple-git</code> configuration parameters.</li>
<li>Attacker crafts a malicious configuration payload: <code>trailer.exploit.cmd=&lt;malicious_command&gt;</code>.</li>
<li>The Node.js application accepts the input and initializes <code>simple-git</code> with the tainted configuration.</li>
<li><code>simple-git</code>'s <code>commandConfigPrefixingPlugin</code> processes the configuration, converting it to <code>-c trailer.exploit.cmd=&lt;malicious_command&gt;</code>.</li>
<li><code>blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin</code> evaluates the arguments; it ignores <code>trailer.*.cmd</code> keys as they are missing from the <code>preventUnsafeConfig</code> list.</li>
<li>The application executes a Git command (e.g., <code>git interpret-trailers</code>) with the injected configuration.</li>
<li>The underlying Git binary executes the attacker-supplied shell command as the Node.js process.</li>
<li>Attacker achieves remote code execution within the context of the application service.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation results in arbitrary command execution on the host running the Node.js application. The impact is limited only by the filesystem, network, and service permissions of the application process. Potential outcomes include exfiltration of local sensitive files, lateral movement within the environment, or full system compromise if the service runs with elevated privileges.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<p>Prioritize the immediate audit of all code paths that utilize <code>simple-git</code> and pass user-supplied data into the <code>config</code> object or command arguments.</p>
<ul>
<li>Update <code>simple-git</code> to version 4.0.1 or later once available, as this release remediates the missing matcher.</li>
<li>Implement an explicit allowlist for Git configuration keys instead of relying solely on the default <code>blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin</code>.</li>
<li>Ensure any application-level sanitization logic prevents the injection of <code>trailer.*.cmd</code> and <code>trailer.*.command</code> keys into <code>simple-git</code> configuration objects.</li>
<li>Deploy runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes spawned by Node.js applications that utilize Git, specifically looking for <code>git</code> spawning unexpected shell commands.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">threat</category><category>supply-chain</category><category>vulnerability</category><category>remote-code-execution</category></item></channel></rss>