<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Rtl_433 (&lt;= 25.12) - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/rtl_433--25.12/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 08:26:39 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/rtl_433--25.12/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>rtl_433: Stack-based buffer overflow in proflame2_mc (CVE-2026-117609)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-rtl433-buffer-overflow/</link><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 08:26:39 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-rtl433-buffer-overflow/</guid><description>rtl_433 versions up to 25.12 contain a stack-based buffer overflow in the proflame2_mc function that allows attackers to trigger memory corruption via malicious OOK radio signals or input files.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the <code>proflame2_mc()</code> function of rtl_433 (all versions through 25.12). The issue occurs when the application processes more than seven Manchester-coded words. An attacker within radio range can transmit a crafted On-Off Keying (OOK) signal or provide a malformed signal file to trigger the overflow. This can result in application crashes or, if the binary is compiled without stack canaries, potential control-flow hijacking.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation allows for the crash of the rtl_433 service or potential arbitrary code execution, depending on the compiler protections enabled for the specific deployment.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade rtl_433 to a version that patches the <code>proflame2_mc()</code> function, or monitor the project repository for the official security release addressing this vulnerability.</li>
<li>Audit current deployments to determine if they are compiled with stack protection (e.g., <code>-fstack-protector</code> or <code>-fstack-protector-strong</code>) to mitigate the risk of arbitrary code execution.</li>
<li>Restrict the input sources for rtl_433 if possible, particularly by verifying the integrity of signal capture files before processing them.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>buffer-overflow</category><category>vulnerability</category><category>rtl_433</category></item></channel></rss>