Rainbond (6.9.7) - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/rainbond-6.9.7/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioThu, 13 Aug 2026 18:56:58 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.pngCraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/3232https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svgBroken Access Control in Rainbond APIhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-rainbond-idor/Thu, 13 Aug 2026 18:56:58 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-rainbond-idor/Rainbond through version 6.9.7 contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability (CVE-2026-72741) in the CheckToken function, allowing authenticated attackers to access or modify resources of other enterprise tenants.Rainbond, an open-source cloud-native application management platform, contains a critical broken access control vulnerability in its CheckToken function (CVE-2026-72741). Affecting all versions through 6.9.7, this vulnerability is classified as an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) under CWE-639. The flaw resides in the authentication and authorization logic where the platform fails to properly validate the enterprise ID associated with an API request. Authenticated users can bypass security checks by substituting the tenant name in the URL path of API requests. By doing so, an attacker can escalate privileges across enterprise boundaries to access, modify, or delete sensitive configurations, including environment variables, managed services, plugin configurations, and cryptographic certificates belonging to other tenants. This vulnerability poses a significant risk to multi-tenant environments where tenant isolation is a core security requirement.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker authenticates to the Rainbond platform using valid credentials belonging to a low-privileged tenant account.
  2. Attacker identifies the API endpoint patterns used to manage enterprise-specific resources (e.g., /v1/enterprises/{tenant_name}/...).
  3. Attacker intercepts an outbound request to an authorized resource using a proxy tool.
  4. Attacker modifies the tenant name parameter in the URL path to correspond to a targeted enterprise identifier.
  5. Attacker submits the modified API request, re-using their existing legitimate API token.
  6. The CheckToken function fails to verify that the provided token holds authorization for the target tenant's UUID or namespace.
  7. The backend processes the request and executes the requested operation (read, modify, or delete) on the victim tenant's resources.
  8. Attacker gains unauthorized control over target enterprise services, environment variables, or security certificates.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows for unauthorized cross-tenant data access and modification. In a multi-tenant Rainbond deployment, this could lead to the exposure of secrets stored in environment variables, the manipulation of application services, and the compromise of internal service certificates, potentially facilitating further lateral movement or supply chain attacks against downstream enterprise applications.

Recommendation

  • Prioritize upgrading all instances of Rainbond to the latest patched version immediately.
  • Implement API request logging on the Rainbond management gateway to monitor for cross-tenant access attempts.
  • Use web server or WAF logs to identify requests containing unexpected or anomalous tenant identifiers in the request URI.
  • Conduct a configuration audit of all multi-tenant environments to ensure no critical secrets or certificates are accessible to non-admin roles even after the patch is applied.
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