{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/powerpnt.exe/","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_products":["WINWORD.EXE","EXCEL.EXE","POWERPNT.EXE","MSPUB.EXE","MSACCESS.EXE"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["wmi","image load","office","execution"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Microsoft"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis detection rule identifies suspicious image loading of \u003ccode\u003ewmiutils.dll\u003c/code\u003e from Microsoft Office processes (WINWORD.EXE, EXCEL.EXE, POWERPNT.EXE, MSPUB.EXE, MSACCESS.EXE). Adversaries can use this technique to execute code and evade traditional parent/child processes spawned from Microsoft Office products. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where child processes are spawned via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUser opens a malicious Microsoft Office document (e.g., Word, Excel).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe document contains a macro or exploit that triggers the execution of WMI commands.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Office application spawns a WMI process or utilizes existing WMI infrastructure.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe WMI process loads the \u003ccode\u003ewmiutils.dll\u003c/code\u003e library, which is unusual for normal Office operations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe WMI commands execute malicious code, potentially downloading or executing further payloads.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker establishes persistence through WMI event subscriptions or other methods.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker performs lateral movement using WMI to execute commands on other systems.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, and move laterally within the network, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or ransomware deployment. While the number of victims is unknown, this technique can be used in targeted attacks against organizations that heavily rely on Microsoft Office applications.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026ldquo;Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office\u0026rdquo; to your SIEM and tune for your environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon event ID 7 (Image Loaded) logging for comprehensive image load monitoring as suggested in the \u003ca href=\"https://ela.st/sysmon-event-7-setup\"\u003esetup instructions\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor process creation events for Microsoft Office applications spawning WMI-related processes (e.g., \u003ccode\u003ewbemtest.exe\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ewmic.exe\u003c/code\u003e) to detect potential WMI abuse.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement network segmentation to limit lateral movement in case of a successful WMI-based attack.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-09T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-09T12:00:00Z","id":"/briefs/2024-01-suspicious-wmi-image-load/","summary":"Adversaries may exploit Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute code stealthily, bypassing traditional security measures by loading `wmiutils.dll` from Microsoft Office applications, potentially indicating malicious execution.","title":"Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-suspicious-wmi-image-load/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed — POWERPNT.EXE","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}