The vulnerability exists because these components use Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize() as a fallback for JSON decoding. The unserialize() wrapper defaults to an unrestricted class allowlist, allowing any PHP class present in the application scope to be instantiated. Attackers who can influence the content of the *__hotspots object-store columns - for instance, via a separate storage-write or SQL injection primitive - can inject crafted serialized PHP payloads. Upon the next retrieval and loading of the DataObject, the application instantiates these objects and triggers their magic methods (such as __wakeup or __destruct), enabling Remote Code Execution (RCE) via gadget chains, such as those found in the bundled guzzlehttp/guzzle library.

Attack Chain

1. Attacker gains a write primitive to the Pimcore database, specifically targeting the *__hotspots columns in object-store tables.
2. Attacker selects a gadget chain present in the application's dependencies (e.g., GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar in guzzlehttp/guzzle).
3. Attacker crafts a malicious serialized PHP payload using a tool like phpggc to target the chosen gadget.
4. Attacker executes an SQL UPDATE statement to overwrite the target object's column with the malicious serialized bytes.
5. The application retrieves the affected DataObject from the database through the standard model loading layer.
6. The Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() method is invoked during object hydration, attempting to JSON decode the payload, which fails.
7. The application falls back to Serialize::unserialize(), which deserializes the malicious bytes without an allowlist.
8. Magic methods trigger, executing the gadget chain and achieving the attacker's final objective (e.g., arbitrary file write or RCE).

Impact

Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution on the Pimcore server. This vulnerability affects all currently maintained versions, including v2026.1.4 and v12.3.8. Because these components are heavily used in DataObject management, an attacker with low-level write access to the database can achieve full system compromise.

Recommendation

1. Immediately audit all custom code and database access layers that interact with object-store columns to prevent unauthorized write access to the metadata columns.
2. Apply upcoming patches from the Pimcore vendor that implement a strictly constrained class allowlist in Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize().
3. As a temporary mitigation, implement a WAF or database firewall rule to inspect and block serialized PHP strings (e.g., O:\d+:") within SQL queries directed at the application database.
4. Perform periodic integrity checks on *__hotspots columns in object-store tables to identify unexpected serialized payloads that deviate from standard JSON formatting.