{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","favicon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.png","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/phpmyfaq--4.2.0-alpha/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","icon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/apple-touch-icon.png","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":["cpe:2.3:a:phpmyfaq:phpmyfaq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"_cs_cves":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56738"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["phpMyFAQ (\u003c= 4.1.5)","phpMyFAQ (3.2.0 - 4.1.5)","phpMyFAQ (\u003c 4.2.0-alpha)"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["cve-2026-56737","authentication-bypass","web-security"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["phpMyFAQ"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003ephpMyFAQ versions up to and including 4.1.5 contain a SQL injection vulnerability within the \u003ccode\u003eStopWords::add()\u003c/code\u003e method in \u003ccode\u003esrc/phpMyFAQ/StopWords.php\u003c/code\u003e. The vulnerability occurs because the application uses \u003ccode\u003esprintf()\u003c/code\u003e to construct SQL queries but fails to sanitize the user-supplied stop word input using the database driver's \u003ccode\u003eescape()\u003c/code\u003e method. While sibling methods like \u003ccode\u003eStopWords::update()\u003c/code\u003e correctly implement escaping, the \u003ccode\u003eadd()\u003c/code\u003e method omits this security control, creating an inconsistency that allows authenticated administrative users to break out of the SQL string literal.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn attacker with administrative privileges can inject arbitrary SQL commands, such as \u003ccode\u003eDROP TABLE\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eUNION\u003c/code\u003e-based exfiltration, or unauthorized data modification. While the threat requires authenticated administrative access, it represents a significant risk for environments where administrative sessions may be hijacked or compromised, or where administrative credentials are shared.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker gains access to a valid phpMyFAQ administrator session through credential theft or session hijacking.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker logs into the phpMyFAQ administration panel.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker navigates to the Stop Words management interface.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker enters a malicious payload containing SQL metacharacters (e.g., \u003ccode\u003etest', 'en'); DROP TABLE faqstopwords; --\u003c/code\u003e) into the new stop word field.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003eStopWords::add()\u003c/code\u003e method processes the unsanitized input via \u003ccode\u003esprintf()\u003c/code\u003e and constructs a malformed SQL query.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe application executes the concatenated SQL statement against the backend database.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe database driver interprets the injected content as a legitimate second command, leading to unauthorized data exfiltration or table destruction.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows an authenticated administrator to bypass intended application logic to perform unauthorized database operations. This can lead to total loss of database integrity through table deletion, exfiltration of sensitive FAQ content or user credentials, and modification of internal application data. The vulnerability highlights a failure in input validation that persists until the application is patched to use consistent escaping or, preferably, prepared statements.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUpgrade phpMyFAQ to a version later than 4.1.5 immediately to resolve the inconsistency in the \u003ccode\u003eStopWords::add()\u003c/code\u003e method.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAudit database query patterns across the \u003ccode\u003eStopWords\u003c/code\u003e class to ensure consistent use of \u003ccode\u003eescape()\u003c/code\u003e for all input parameters concatenated into SQL strings.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePrioritize migrating \u003ccode\u003esprintf()\u003c/code\u003e-based database interactions to parameterized or prepared statements (e.g., \u003ccode\u003ePDO::prepare()\u003c/code\u003e) to structurally eliminate this class of vulnerability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor web server logs for administrative accounts performing suspicious SQL syntax patterns (e.g., \u003ccode\u003eUNION\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eDROP TABLE\u003c/code\u003e) originating from the stop words management endpoints.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-09-24T20:05:56Z","date_published":"2026-09-24T20:05:37Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-phpmyfaq-sqli/","summary":"An authenticated administrator can exploit an unescaped SQL insertion vulnerability in the phpMyFAQ StopWords::add() method (CVE-2026-56738) to execute arbitrary database commands.","title":"SQL Injection in phpMyFAQ StopWords::add()","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-phpmyfaq-sqli/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - PhpMyFAQ (\u003c 4.2.0-Alpha)","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}