{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","favicon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.png","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/pgedge-control-plane--0.10.1/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","icon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/apple-touch-icon.png","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":["cpe:2.3:a:pgedge:control_plane:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"_cs_cves":[{"cvss":7.8,"id":"CVE-2026-125323"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["pgEdge Control Plane (\u003c= 0.10.1)"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":[],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["pgEdge"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe pgEdge Control Plane automatically generates \u003ccode\u003epg_hba.conf\u003c/code\u003e files that contain hard-coded \u003ccode\u003etrust\u003c/code\u003e authentication entries for Unix-socket and loopback connections. Because these entries are placed at the top of the configuration file, they take precedence over any operator-defined security rules. This enables any local operating-system account with access to the database host or Postgres socket to authenticate as any database role, including the superuser, without providing credentials. This issue is identified as CVE-2026-125323.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation results in full control over all databases hosted on the affected instance, including the ability to read, modify, or destroy all data. On deployments using systemd, any local user can perform these actions. In containerized environments, the impact is limited to users who have already gained code execution within the container.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUpgrade pgEdge Control Plane to version v0.11.0 or later immediately. This update removes the hard-coded \u003ccode\u003etrust\u003c/code\u003e entries.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFor operators unable to upgrade, restrict file system permissions on the Unix socket for the database (e.g., set \u003ccode\u003eunix_socket_permissions\u003c/code\u003e to \u003ccode\u003e0700\u003c/code\u003e) to prevent unauthorized local accounts from accessing the socket path.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-11-12T22:16:54Z","date_published":"2026-11-12T22:16:54Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-11-pgedge-hba-trust-ghsa-vq9p-w6wv-cr25/","summary":"The pgEdge Control Plane forces 'trust' authentication for all local and loopback connections in generated pg_hba.conf files, allowing local users to escalate privileges to Postgres superuser.","title":"pgEdge Control Plane: Improper pg_hba.conf configuration (CVE-2026-125323)","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-11-pgedge-hba-trust-ghsa-vq9p-w6wv-cr25/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - PgEdge Control Plane (\u003c= 0.10.1)","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}