Patool (< 4.0.6) - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/patool--4.0.6/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioWed, 07 Oct 2026 12:37:23 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.pngCraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/3232https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svgOS Command Injection in patool via Malicious Filenameshttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-patool-command-injection/Wed, 07 Oct 2026 12:37:23 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-patool-command-injection/The patool library prior to version 4.0.6 contains an OS command injection vulnerability on Windows that allows arbitrary command execution via crafted archive filenames.The patool library, a portable archive file manager, is vulnerable to OS command injection in versions prior to 4.0.6 when running on Windows. The issue stems from the shell_quote_nt function, which fails to correctly sanitize or escape cmd.exe metacharacters and embedded double quotes in archive filenames. When the library processes a crafted filename containing these characters (e.g., 'report&calc.gz') within a context where shell=True is invoked, it inadvertently triggers the execution of arbitrary commands. This vulnerability affects any Windows-based application or service that utilizes patool to handle untrusted user-supplied archive files, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution with the permissions of the application process.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows for arbitrary code execution on the host machine with the privileges of the user running the patool-based application. This vulnerability poses a significant risk in environments where users can upload or provide archive files for automated processing, such as web applications or file-transfer services.

Recommendation

Upgrade the patool library to version 4.0.6 or later immediately to resolve the shell_quote_nt escaping issue.

Rules

title: "Detect Suspicious Command Execution via patool" description: "Detects potential command injection exploitation where cmd.exe metacharacters are passed to a sub-process spawned by a python application process likely using patool." logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains:

  • "&"
  • "|"
  • "&&"
  • "||"
  • "^" filter: Image|endswith:
  • "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"
  • "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe" condition: selection and filter level: high tags:
  • attack.execution
  • attack.t1059.003 falsepositives:
  • "Legitimate administrative scripts using command chaining"
  • "System maintenance tasks" tests: positive:
  • name: "Cmd.exe execution with shell metacharacters in command line" data:
  • Image: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" CommandLine: "cmd.exe /c extract file&calc.exe" negative:
  • name: "Standard process creation" data:
  • Image: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" CommandLine: "cmd.exe /c echo hello" handoff: detection_confidence: "medium" required_telemetry:
  • log_source: "Sysmon process_creation" event_or_channel: "Event ID 1" required_fields:
  • "Image"
  • "CommandLine" availability: "available" notes: "Monitor cmd.exe spawns for suspicious command line arguments." validation: status: "needs_environment_validation" known_evasions:
  • "Using alternative shells or direct API calls not involving cmd.exe." limitations:
  • "High potential for noise in administrative environments." tuning:
  • source: "Administrator scripts" guidance: "Exclude known administrative service accounts or deployment script paths."
]]>highadvisory