{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/npmpraisonai--1.2.3--1.7.1/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["npm:praisonai (\u003e= 1.2.3, \u003c= 1.7.1)"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["command-injection","npm","nodejs","sandbox-bypass","vulnerability","rce","server-side"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["PraisonAI"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003enpm:praisonai\u003c/code\u003e package, which provides \u0026quot;safe command execution with restrictions\u0026quot; via its \u003ccode\u003eSandboxExecutor\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eCommandValidator\u003c/code\u003e components, contains a critical vulnerability affecting versions 1.2.3 through 1.7.1. The \u003ccode\u003eCommandValidator\u003c/code\u003e component incorrectly processes command strings when \u003ccode\u003eallowedCommands\u003c/code\u003e is configured: it only checks the first whitespace-delimited token for allowlisting, while the \u003ccode\u003eSandboxExecutor\u003c/code\u003e subsequently passes the entire, unmodified command string to \u003ccode\u003espawn(\u0026quot;sh\u0026quot;, [\u0026quot;-c\u0026quot;, command])\u003c/code\u003e. This discrepancy allows attackers to append arbitrary shell commands using metacharacters (e.g., \u003ccode\u003e;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e\u0026amp;\u0026amp;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e||\u003c/code\u003e) after an allowlisted initial command, bypassing the intended security controls. This allows for arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process if lower-trust input (such as user prompts or model output) is processed by the vulnerable component. The vulnerability is present in \u003ccode\u003esrc/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts\u003c/code\u003e and confirmed in distributed \u003ccode\u003enpm:praisonai@1.7.1\u003c/code\u003e files.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker crafts a malicious command string that begins with an allowlisted command (e.g., \u003ccode\u003eecho\u003c/code\u003e) followed by shell metacharacters and arbitrary commands (e.g., \u003ccode\u003eecho allowed; cat /tmp/marker\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThis malicious command string is supplied as input to an application, CLI tool, or agent pipeline that utilizes the \u003ccode\u003enpm:praisonai\u003c/code\u003e library's \u003ccode\u003eSandboxExecutor\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003esandboxExec\u003c/code\u003e function.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003eCommandValidator\u003c/code\u003e component within \u003ccode\u003epraisonai\u003c/code\u003e receives the command string and checks its \u003ccode\u003eallowedCommands\u003c/code\u003e policy by extracting only the first whitespace-delimited token (e.g., \u003ccode\u003eecho\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIf the first token matches an entry in the \u003ccode\u003eallowedCommands\u003c/code\u003e list, the \u003ccode\u003eCommandValidator\u003c/code\u003e incorrectly deems the entire command string valid and permits its execution.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003eSandboxExecutor\u003c/code\u003e proceeds to invoke \u003ccode\u003espawn('sh', ['-c', malicious_command_string])\u003c/code\u003e, passing the full, unvalidated string directly to the system shell.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003esh\u003c/code\u003e process interprets the shell metacharacter (e.g., \u003ccode\u003e;\u003c/code\u003e) as a command separator, executing both the initially allowlisted command and the subsequent arbitrary malicious commands (e.g., \u003ccode\u003ecat /tmp/marker\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process, enabling actions such as reading or modifying files, invoking local tools, or causing denial of service.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows for arbitrary shell command execution within the context of the PraisonAI process. Depending on the privileges of the hosting application and the affected system, this can lead to severe consequences, including unauthorized access to sensitive data (confidentiality), modification or deletion of critical files (integrity), and disruption of service (availability). If the PraisonAI application handles lower-trust input, such as from user prompts or AI model outputs, the risk of compromise is significantly elevated. While the advisory notes a local-only proof-of-concept, the nature of the vulnerability means that any application exposing \u003ccode\u003eSandboxExecutor\u003c/code\u003e's functionality to external input could be at risk.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUpgrade \u003ccode\u003enpm:praisonai\u003c/code\u003e to a patched version once available. Monitor the official GitHub advisory GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 for release information.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the provided Sigma rule \u0026quot;Detect Suspicious \u003ccode\u003esh -c\u003c/code\u003e Spawns by Node.js with Shell Chaining\u0026quot; to your SIEM system to identify attempts at exploiting this vulnerability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable comprehensive \u003ccode\u003eprocess_creation\u003c/code\u003e logging on all Linux systems running Node.js applications that might utilize \u003ccode\u003enpm:praisonai\u003c/code\u003e or similar command execution libraries.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview applications using \u003ccode\u003enpm:praisonai\u003c/code\u003e versions \u0026gt;= 1.2.3, \u0026lt;= 1.7.1 to ensure that any input passed to \u003ccode\u003eSandboxExecutor\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003esandboxExec\u003c/code\u003e is strictly validated and sanitized, avoiding shell metacharacters.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAs a temporary mitigation, if direct patching is not immediately feasible, consider implementing input sanitization at the application layer to strip or escape shell metacharacters before passing commands to \u003ccode\u003enpm:praisonai\u003c/code\u003e functions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-06-18T15:04:55Z","date_published":"2026-06-18T15:04:55Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-06-npm-praisonai-sandboxexecutor-bypass/","summary":"A critical command injection vulnerability exists in the `npm:praisonai` package versions \u003e= 1.2.3 and \u003c= 1.7.1, where the `SandboxExecutor`'s `allowedCommands` policy is bypassed by allowing arbitrary shell command chaining after an allowlisted command, leading to remote code execution with the PraisonAI process privileges.","title":"npm PraisonAI SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-06-npm-praisonai-sandboxexecutor-bypass/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Npm:praisonai (\u003e= 1.2.3, \u003c= 1.7.1)","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}