Nimiq-Block — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/nimiq-block/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata — refreshed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioTue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000Nimiq Block Skip Block Quorum Bypass Vulnerabilityhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-nimiq-block-quorum-bypass/Tue, 02 Jan 2024 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-nimiq-block-quorum-bypass/A vulnerability exists in Nimiq Block's SkipBlockProof verification process, allowing attackers to bypass quorum checks by manipulating MultiSignature signers with out-of-range indices, potentially compromising blockchain integrity, and affecting rust/nimiq-block versions 0.2.0 and earlier.A critical vulnerability has been identified in the Nimiq Block’s SkipBlockProof::verify function within the rust-albatross core. This vulnerability stems from the way the quorum check is performed. The vulnerability lies in the ability to craft MultiSignature.signers that contain out-of-range indices spaced by 65536, inflating the len() calculation but colliding onto the same in-range u16 slot during aggregation due to truncation. The vulnerability affects rust/nimiq-block versions <= 0.2.0. Successful exploitation allows a malicious validator with significantly fewer than the required 2f+1 signer slots to pass skip block proof verification. This bypasses the intended security mechanisms, potentially undermining the blockchain’s consensus and integrity.

Attack Chain

  1. Attacker identifies a Nimiq Block instance running a vulnerable version (<= 0.2.0) of the rust/nimiq-block package.
  2. The attacker crafts a malicious MultiSignature.signers payload.
  3. The malicious payload contains out-of-range indices spaced by 65536. These indices are specifically designed to inflate the BitSet.len() calculation used in the quorum check.
  4. During verification within SkipBlockProof::verify, the usize indices are cast to u16 (slot as u16) for slot lookup.
  5. Due to the u16 truncation, the out-of-range indices collide onto the same in-range slot. This creates an artificial aggregation of signatures.
  6. The attacker multiplies a single BLS signature by a factor to match the inflated len() value.
  7. The manipulated SkipBlockProof passes the quorum check due to the inflated len() and signature aggregation.
  8. The malicious skip block is accepted, potentially leading to consensus manipulation or other attacks on the blockchain.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows a malicious validator to bypass the standard quorum requirements for skip block proof verification. This means that a single compromised validator or a small group of colluding validators can inject fraudulent blocks into the blockchain, potentially leading to double-spending, denial-of-service, or other attacks that compromise the integrity and availability of the Nimiq blockchain. Given the severity of these potential outcomes, this vulnerability poses a critical risk to any system relying on affected versions of Nimiq Block.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade to rust/nimiq-block version 1.3.0 or later, which includes the fix for CVE-2026-33471.
  • Monitor network traffic for anomalies related to skip block submissions, focusing on unusually large MultiSignature.signers payloads with indices spaced by multiples of 65536. Create a network monitoring rule.
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