N8n-Mcp (< 2.50.1) — CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/n8n-mcp--2.50.1/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioFri, 08 May 2026 17:00:09 +0000n8n-mcp Vulnerable to Path Traversal, SSRF, and Telemetry Exposurehttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-16-n8n-mcp-vulns/Fri, 08 May 2026 17:00:09 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-16-n8n-mcp-vulns/n8n-mcp versions before 2.50.1 are vulnerable to path traversal, redirect-following SSRF, and telemetry payload exposure, potentially leading to sensitive information disclosure and unauthorized access.n8n-mcp versions prior to 2.50.1 are susceptible to three distinct vulnerabilities affecting deployments that leverage the n8n API integration. The first issue involves a lack of validation for caller-supplied identifiers used as URL path segments, enabling authenticated MCP callers to manipulate workflow IDs and direct outbound requests with the configured n8n API key to unintended same-origin endpoints, effectively bypassing access controls. The second vulnerability arises from validated webhook, form, and chat trigger URLs following redirects, potentially redirecting outbound requests to untrusted hosts and exposing the response body to the caller as a non-blind SSRF. Finally, the default opt-in telemetry feature stores unredacted operation payloads, which may contain sensitive information like bearer tokens, API keys, and webhook secrets from workflow node parameters. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could lead to sensitive data exposure and unauthorized access to internal resources.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker gains authenticated access to the n8n-mcp instance.
  2. The attacker crafts a malicious workflow ID containing path traversal characters.
  3. The attacker makes an MCP call using the crafted workflow ID.
  4. The n8n-mcp instance, lacking proper validation, incorporates the malicious ID into the outbound URL path.
  5. The n8n-mcp instance initiates an HTTP request using the constructed URL, including the configured n8n API key.
  6. The request is redirected to a different endpoint within the same origin.
  7. The attacker gains access to resources or performs actions on the redirected endpoint, bypassing intended access controls.

Impact

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could lead to significant damage. The path traversal and SSRF vulnerabilities can allow attackers to bypass access controls and gain unauthorized access to internal resources, potentially leading to data breaches or system compromise. The exposure of sensitive information in telemetry data can compromise API keys, secrets, and other credentials, enabling further attacks and unauthorized access to external services. While specific victim counts are unavailable, organizations using affected versions of n8n-mcp are at risk.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade to n8n-mcp >= 2.50.1 to remediate the vulnerabilities (see Patched versions).
  • Apply network access restrictions (firewall, reverse-proxy ACL, or VPN) to the MCP HTTP port, allowing only trusted callers to access it, mitigating issues (1) and (2). Alternatively, switch to stdio mode to eliminate the HTTP attack surface (see Workarounds).
  • Disable telemetry by setting N8N_MCP_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=true in the environment before starting the server, or run npx n8n-mcp telemetry disable once, addressing issue (3) (see Workarounds).
  • Monitor network traffic for unexpected outbound connections originating from the n8n-mcp instance, potentially indicating SSRF attempts.
]]>highadvisorypath-traversalssrftelemetryinformation-disclosure