Attack Chain

1. An attacker authenticates to the MoviePilot v2 application.
2. The attacker crafts a malicious URL targeting an internal resource (e.g., a private IP address hosting a service like Jellyfin).
3. The attacker obtains a valid resource_token cookie.
4. The attacker sends a request to the image proxy endpoint with the crafted URL and the resource_token cookie.
5. The SecurityUtils.is_safe_url function checks if the domain in the crafted URL is present in the assembled allowlist but does not validate the IP address range (private, loopback, or link-local).
6. The image proxy endpoint processes the request without proper validation.
7. The MoviePilot server makes a request to the specified internal resource.
8. The attacker receives the response from the internal resource, potentially revealing sensitive information or allowing further exploitation.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this SSRF vulnerability (CVE-2026-10107) could allow an attacker to enumerate internal services (Jellyfin, Emby, Plex) and potentially exfiltrate sensitive data from internal network resources. The impact includes potential disclosure of sensitive data, compromise of internal services, and further lateral movement within the network. The CVSS v3.1 base score for this vulnerability is 7.7, indicating a high severity.

Recommendation

• Deploy the Sigma rule to detect SSRF attempts by monitoring for requests to the image proxy endpoint with potentially malicious URLs targeting internal IP addresses or loopback addresses.
• Apply the Sigma rule to detect potential enumeration of internal services through SSRF by monitoring requests to common service ports or paths from the MoviePilot server.
• Implement stricter validation of URLs within the SecurityUtils.is_safe_url function to block private, loopback, and link-local addresses, preventing SSRF attacks.
• Apply network segmentation and access controls to limit the MoviePilot server’s access to only necessary internal resources.