Attack Chain

1. The MKP server listens on port 8080 by default without requiring authentication.
2. The NewGetResourceTool() is unconditionally registered, making the get_resource MCP tool available to unauthenticated users.
3. An unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted tools/call request via an HTTP POST to the /mcp endpoint, specifying resource: "pods" and subresource: "logs".
4. Within the request parameters, the attacker supplies arbitrarily large int64 string values for limitBytes (e.g., "2147483647") or tailLines (e.g., "999999999").
5. The MKP server processes these unbounded parameters without validation and forwards them to the Kubernetes API to retrieve pod logs.
6. The server then attempts to read the entire potentially massive log stream returned by the Kubernetes API directly into an in-memory bytes.Buffer using io.Copy, without any application-level size constraints.
7. This unbounded read rapidly consumes the MKP server's available memory, causing its Resident Set Size (RSS) to grow significantly.
8. The MKP server process eventually exhausts system memory, leading to an Out-of-Memory (OOM) termination and a denial of service for the entire MKP service.

Impact

This is an unauthenticated remote Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability that affects any deployment of the MKP server accessible over the network. Organizations running mkp-server in its default configuration are vulnerable, as no authentication or specific flags are required to exploit get_resource. Kubernetes clusters containing pods with large accumulated logs, such as kube-system workloads in production environments, are particularly susceptible. The success of this attack makes the entire MKP service unavailable, disrupting cluster observability and any downstream consumers relying on the MCP interface. A single crafted tools/call request with a sufficiently large limitBytes or tailLines value is enough to trigger the memory exhaustion, as the internal rate limiter only caps request frequency and not data volume.

Recommendation

• Update the MKP server to a patched version that implements application-side limits for limitBytes and tailLines parameters as described in the provided remediation code.
• Restrict network access to the MKP server's default port 8080 from untrusted sources to reduce the attack surface.
• Monitor the MKP server process memory usage (RSS) for sudden, large increases or OOM events that deviate from normal operational baselines.
• Review web server or proxy logs for HTTP POST requests to the /mcp endpoint containing tools/call method with unusually large string values for limitBytes or tailLines in the JSON request body.