<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Mcp-Bridge-Api - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/mcp-bridge-api/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Sat, 08 Aug 2026 07:37:58 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/mcp-bridge-api/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Remote Command Injection in INQUIRELAB mcp-bridge-api</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-mcp-bridge-api-command-injection/</link><pubDate>Sat, 08 Aug 2026 07:37:58 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-08-mcp-bridge-api-command-injection/</guid><description>A command injection vulnerability in the mcp-bridge.js component of mcp-bridge-api allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary system commands via manipulation of the command/args argument.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A remote command injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-19263) has been identified in the INQUIRELAB mcp-bridge-api, affecting versions up to commit b30a82aa1d1d1139e0de846c41c8aadee6e06114. The flaw resides in the 'Servers Endpoint' component within the 'mcp-bridge.js' file. By supplying maliciously crafted input to the 'command' or 'args' parameters, an unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger the execution of arbitrary commands with the privileges of the application process. Because the project utilizes a rolling release model without discrete versioning, users are advised to monitor the upstream repository for a merged pull request. This vulnerability is critical for organizations deploying mcp-bridge-api as it provides a direct vector for code execution on the hosting infrastructure.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation allows remote code execution on the underlying server or container hosting the mcp-bridge-api. This may lead to full system compromise, unauthorized data access, lateral movement within the network, or the deployment of additional malicious payloads. As a library and API bridge component, this vulnerability potentially impacts any service integrating mcp-bridge-api, making it a significant risk for microservices architectures using the bridge.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Implement egress filtering on the host running mcp-bridge-api to block suspicious outbound connections that would indicate successful command execution (e.g., reverse shells).</li>
<li>Monitor application logs for anomalous requests to the 'Servers Endpoint' containing shell metacharacters such as semicolon, pipe, or backticks in the 'command' or 'args' parameters.</li>
<li>Track the upstream repository for the fix and deploy the updated container or build immediately once the pending pull request is merged.</li>
<li>Perform a code audit of the 'mcp-bridge.js' file if internal deployment requires custom patching prior to an official release.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>vulnerability</category><category>remote-code-execution</category><category>webserver</category></item></channel></rss>