<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>LXD (&gt;= 0.0.0-20250721152936-Fe86ceb2c3fa, &lt; 0.0.0-20260626085133-7cb96ac80a6d) - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/lxd--0.0.0-20250721152936-fe86ceb2c3fa--0.0.0-20260626085133-7cb96ac80a6d/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 22:30:36 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/lxd--0.0.0-20250721152936-fe86ceb2c3fa--0.0.0-20260626085133-7cb96ac80a6d/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>LXD: Cross-guest storage volume hijacking (CVE-2026-12411)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-11-lxd-devlxd-hijack/</link><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 22:30:36 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-11-lxd-devlxd-hijack/</guid><description>An authorization flaw in the LXD DevLXD storage API allows an authenticated guest container to attach and gain read/write access to arbitrary storage volumes owned by other guests within the same project.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>LXD is susceptible to cross-guest volume hijacking due to missing ownership checks in the instance device-update path. When <code>security.devlxd.management.volumes</code> is enabled, the API fails to validate if an identity has ownership of a custom storage volume during a <code>PATCH</code> request to update instance devices. This enables a malicious guest to attach volumes belonging to other guests, resulting in full read/write access to the victim’s data. Volume names can be discovered via error probing.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Attacker obtains a valid DevLXD identity with <code>can_edit</code> permissions for their own instance.</li>
<li>Attacker probes for volume names by attempting to attach them via <code>PATCH</code> requests to the DevLXD instance endpoint.</li>
<li>LXD processes the <code>PATCH</code> request for a disk device.</li>
<li>The <code>devLXDInstancePatchHandler</code> validates the device configuration shape (type, pool, source) but skips volume ownership/RBAC checks.</li>
<li>LXD attaches the victim's volume to the attacker's instance.</li>
<li>Attacker reads or overwrites data within the mounted volume at the specified mount point.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Exploitation allows for unauthorized access, modification, and potential data exfiltration of storage volumes belonging to other tenants within the same LXD project. The impact is limited to environments where <code>security.devlxd.management.volumes</code> is explicitly enabled.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade LXD to the version containing the fix for CVE-2026-12411 (&gt;= 0.0.0-20260626085133-7cb96ac80a6d).</li>
<li>In environments where patching is deferred, disable <code>security.devlxd.management.volumes</code> for all instances in shared projects.</li>
<li>Audit existing LXD instance configurations to identify unauthorized or unexpected disk devices.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category></item></channel></rss>