Product
Suspicious Pod Creation in Kubernetes System Namespace
2 rules 1 TTPAn attacker may deploy a pod within the kube-system namespace in Kubernetes to mimic legitimate system pods and evade detection.
Kubernetes Event Deletion for Defense Evasion
2 rules 1 TTPAn adversary may delete Kubernetes events to evade detection and hide malicious activity within a Kubernetes environment by removing audit logs.
Kubernetes Sensitive Role Creation or Modification
2 rules 2 TTPsDetects the creation or modification of Kubernetes Roles or ClusterRoles that grant high-risk permissions, such as wildcard access or RBAC escalation verbs, potentially leading to privilege escalation or unauthorized access within the cluster.
Kubernetes RBAC Wildcard Elevation on Existing Role
2 rules 1 TTPThe rule detects when a Kubernetes Role or ClusterRole is patched or updated to grant wildcard verbs and resources, effectively granting cluster-admin-like privileges, which is often a deliberate privilege expansion and could indicate malicious activity.
Kubernetes Secret Access by Node or Pod Service Account
2 rules 1 TTPThis rule detects Kubernetes audit events where a node or pod service account attempts to read secrets directly, which is often a sign of credential access.
Kubernetes Secret Access with Suspicious User Agent
2 rules 1 TTPDetects read access to Kubernetes Secrets (`get`/`list`) with a user agent matching a curated set of non-standard or attacker-leaning clients, indicating potential credential access.
Kubernetes Rapid Secret GET Activity Against Multiple Objects
2 rules 1 TTPDetects an unusual volume of Kubernetes API get requests against multiple distinct Secret objects from the same client fingerprint, potentially indicating credential access or in-cluster reconnaissance.
Kubernetes Secrets Enumeration from Non-Loopback Client
2 rules 2 TTPsDetection of Kubernetes Secrets listing from non-loopback clients targeting cluster-wide secrets or sensitive namespaces, potentially indicating unauthorized credential access or discovery.