Because the JDK materializes these numeric components into java.math.BigInteger or BigDecimal using constructors with O(n²) complexity, an attacker can supply a small payload (e.g., 1 - 5 MB) that results in significant CPU consumption lasting for minutes. This behavior allows an unauthenticated attacker to saturate server worker threads with a limited number of requests, effectively denying service to legitimate traffic. The vulnerability is present in default configurations of the JsonMapper and does not require advanced features like polymorphic typing to exploit.

Attack Chain

1. Attacker identifies an internet-facing application that uses jackson-databind to deserialize JSON into POJOs containing javax.xml.datatype.Duration or XMLGregorianCalendar fields.
2. Attacker constructs a malicious JSON payload where the field value is a string containing an extremely long sequence of numeric characters (e.g., "P" + 5,000,000 nines + "Y").
3. Attacker submits the payload via an HTTP POST request to the application's API endpoint.
4. The jackson-databind library performs default deserialization and identifies the target field type.
5. The library passes the attacker-supplied string token to CoreXMLDeserializers, which omits a length check against the string content.
6. The DatatypeFactory parses the string, invoking the O(n²) BigInteger(String) or BigDecimal(String) constructors within the JDK.
7. The server CPU utilization spikes to 100% for the duration of the parsing process, causing thread exhaustion and blocking subsequent requests.

Impact

Successful exploitation results in a persistent denial of service condition. A single small request of approximately 5 MB can consume several minutes of single-threaded CPU time. By orchestrating a low-volume, concurrent stream of such requests, an attacker can fully exhaust available application worker threads, leading to application-wide unavailability. This vulnerability impacts any service utilizing affected versions of jackson-databind to process user-supplied configuration or XML-derived data models.

Recommendation

1. Upgrade jackson-databind to a patched version immediately: 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2.
2. If immediate patching is not feasible, implement a transport-layer length constraint on all JSON inputs to reject payloads containing abnormally long strings destined for XML-datatype fields.
3. Review application DTOs for fields typed javax.xml.datatype.Duration or XMLGregorianCalendar and implement custom deserializers that enforce strict length bounds on the input string before passing it to the JDK factory methods.