An attacker can trigger this by providing a long, malformed JSON token. Because the implementation appends characters one-by-one to an unbounded StringBuilder without bounds checking, the internal structure grows linearly with the input payload size. This expansion, compounded by byte-to-char conversion, can rapidly deplete heap memory. Critically, existing configuration mitigations such as maxDocumentLength or maxStringLength do not apply to this code path, leaving applications using the DataInput parser implementation without built-in defense against this denial-of-service vector.

Impact

Successful exploitation leads to an OutOfMemoryError within the JVM hosting the vulnerable application. By supplying a large, malformed token, an attacker can cause the process to allocate excessive memory, forcing a crash and resulting in a denial-of-service for any system relying on this parser to process external JSON input. This affects a wide range of Jackson versions (2.8.0 through 3.2.2).

Recommendation

1. Upgrade jackson-core to a patched version once provided by the vendor.
2. If immediate patching is not possible, audit applications to determine if JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput) is used to process untrusted input.
3. Where possible, migrate from DataInput sources to InputStream or Reader based parsers, which currently enforce maxErrorTokenLength bounds correctly.
4. Implement application-level request size limits before passing data to the Jackson parser to mitigate the potential impact of large malicious payloads.