GitHub Actions

A critical repository takeover vulnerability (CVE-2024-58354) exists in the cal.com (calcom/cal.diy) GitHub Actions workflows, allowing an attacker to submit a malicious pull request that executes arbitrary commands with write permissions to the repository, leading to full compromise.

The SANDWORM_MODE campaign is a multi-stage npm supply chain worm that targets AI-augmented development workflows by exploiting runtime behaviors of AI coding assistants and CI/CD pipelines, leading to credential theft, supply chain poisoning, and persistence through obfuscated loaders, credential harvesting, and malicious Git hooks.

Tracking brief for the Shai-Hulud campaign; individual sightings are folded in as reported.

Tracking brief for the ClickFix campaign; individual sightings are folded in as reported.

A supply chain attack compromised over 30 npm packages under Red Hat's '@redhat-cloud-services' namespace, distributing a credential-stealing malware variant named 'Miasma' that targets sensitive developer information.

The 'Megalodon' supply chain attack compromised over 5,500 GitHub repositories by injecting malicious GitHub Actions workflows designed to steal credentials, CI secrets, keys, and tokens.

On April 22, 2026, Checkmarx and Bitwarden suffered supply chain attacks where malicious versions of their developer tools were distributed through official channels, attempting to harvest sensitive information such as GitHub and npm tokens and exfiltrating data to audit.checkmarx[.]cx.

A critical vulnerability in Google's Gemini CLI, an open-source AI agent, could have enabled attackers to inject malicious prompts into GitHub issues, leading to code execution and a supply chain compromise.

Attackers are stealing AWS credentials configured as GitHub Actions secrets and using them from non-CI/CD infrastructure, indicating potential credential theft and unauthorized access to AWS resources.

This analytic detects the creation of new GitHub Actions secrets at the organization, environment, codespaces, or repository level, potentially indicating malicious persistence or privilege escalation.

A GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from `issue_comment.body` directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner.

Detection of changes to self-hosted runner configurations in GitHub environments can indicate potential impact, discovery, collection, persistence, privilege escalation, initial access, or stealth activities.