FortiGate

Detection of FortiGate VPN SSL settings modification, such as authentication rules, linked to observed exploitation campaigns (e.g., CVE-2024-535), which threat actors leverage for persistence and unauthorized access after initial compromise.

An attacker with initial access to a Fortinet FortiGate firewall may modify existing user groups to establish persistence or elevate privileges, potentially granting unauthorized VPN access to internal networks.

This brief details the detection of new local user creation on Fortinet FortiGate firewalls, a behavior often leveraged by adversaries for persistence and unauthorized VPN access, underscoring a critical post-exploitation activity for detection engineers.

This brief describes a detection for the addition of new firewall policies on Fortinet FortiGate devices, a behavior that can indicate defense impairment or unauthorized network access by a malicious actor.

This brief details the detection of firewall address objects being added on Fortinet FortiGate devices, a configuration change that, while potentially legitimate, can also indicate post-compromise activity or unauthorized access, especially when tied to vulnerabilities like FG-IR-24-535, enabling threat actors to bypass security controls or facilitate command and control.

A Russian-speaking threat group utilized a large dataset of administrative and VPN credentials, likely sourced from exposed FortiGate configuration files and active credential harvesting, to access government, critical infrastructure, and multinational corporate networks, resulting in widespread data exfiltration.

A user with the Administrator role has successfully logged in to the FortiGate management interface for the first time within the last 5 days, potentially indicating unauthorized access or misconfiguration.

Threat actors are abusing the Komari monitoring agent, a project hosted on GitHub, as a SYSTEM-level backdoor following initial access through compromised VPN credentials and lateral movement via Impacket.

This brief covers a newly observed Fortigate alert rule added to the Elastic detection rules repository, potentially indicating emerging threat activity targeting Fortigate devices.

This brief details the detection of DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks, where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication, as seen in CVE-2025-33073, using Suricata and Sysmon event ID 22.