Attack Chain

1. A workflow author, possessing valid authentication credentials for flyto-core's Execution API (POST /v1/execute), prepares to execute a module.
2. The attacker crafts a malicious URL containing an IPv6 transition-form host, such as http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/ for loopback access or http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/ for cloud instance metadata.
3. The attacker sends a POST request to http://127.0.0.1:8333/v1/execute with a JSON payload including {"module_id":"http.get", "params":{"url":"[malicious_url]"}}.
4. The flyto-core application invokes validate_url_ssrf, which calls is_private_ip() on the IPv6 transition address. Due to the vulnerability, is_private_ip() incorrectly returns False.
5. The http.get atomic module proceeds to initiate an outbound HTTP GET request using aiohttp to the internal destination specified by the crafted URL.
6. The internal service (e.g., cloud metadata service or a local web server) processes the request and returns its sensitive response body.
7. flyto-core receives the internal service's response and, as part of the http.get module's functionality, returns the full response body to the attacker in the /v1/execute API response.
8. The attacker successfully exfiltrates sensitive data, such as IAM credentials or internal service information, via a read Server-Side Request Forgery.

Impact

The vulnerability allows an authenticated workflow author to bypass flyto-core's security controls and perform read Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This directly enables data exfiltration from internal services that are typically isolated from external access. Specifically, attackers can access cloud instance metadata services (e.g., 169.254.169.254) to steal highly sensitive IAM credentials and instance identity information. Additionally, the bypass permits access to internal loopback and RFC 1918 services, potentially exposing other sensitive internal applications or data. The success of this attack directly undermines the intended security model of flyto-core, which explicitly documents these checks as critical security controls. While the source does not provide victim numbers, any organization using flyto-core is susceptible, especially those deployed in cloud environments.

Recommendation

• Immediately apply the patch provided by flytohub, which modifies src/core/utils.py to correctly identify and block private IP addresses embedded within IPv6 transition forms, as demonstrated in the "Suggested fix" section of this brief.
• Review all flyto-core deployments, especially those in cloud environments, to ensure proper network segmentation and defense-in-depth measures limit the impact of potential SSRF vulnerabilities.
• Monitor network egress logs for connections originating from flyto-core instances to unusual or internal-only IPv6 addresses, particularly those resembling the IPv4-mapped ::ffff:169.254.169.254, NAT64 64:ff9b::/96, or 6to4 2002::/16 prefixes.
• Ensure that cloud metadata services and other sensitive internal endpoints are configured with least privilege access and minimal exposed information, assuming they might eventually be accessed by an SSRF attack.