<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Excel-Mcp-Server (0.1.8) - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/excel-mcp-server-0.1.8/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 17:26:23 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/excel-mcp-server-0.1.8/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>Path Traversal Vulnerability in excel-mcp-server (CVE-2026-85661)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-excel-mcp-server-traversal/</link><pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 17:26:23 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-excel-mcp-server-traversal/</guid><description>The excel-mcp-server package version 0.1.8 fails to enforce path confinement in stdio mode when EXCEL_FILES_PATH is unset, allowing attackers to perform arbitrary file reads and writes on the host system.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The excel-mcp-server package, specifically version 0.1.8, contains a critical path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2026-85661) arising from improper validation of file paths when the <code>EXCEL_FILES_PATH</code> environment variable is not explicitly configured in stdio mode. Because the application fails to enforce directory confinement under these conditions, it inadvertently allows any input provided to its file-related tools to resolve to arbitrary locations on the underlying host filesystem. An attacker capable of interacting with the server's MCP tools can exploit this to read sensitive configuration files, modify application data, or potentially write malicious payloads to system directories, effectively inheriting the permissions of the service process.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation allows for full file system access within the context of the service user. This poses a significant risk of data exfiltration and persistent system compromise, particularly in environments where the service is running with elevated or overly permissive account privileges.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Immediately upgrade to a patched version of excel-mcp-server when available.</li>
<li>Explicitly define the <code>EXCEL_FILES_PATH</code> environment variable in all deployments to restrict the service to a designated, hardened directory.</li>
<li>Audit filesystem logs for unexpected file access patterns originating from the process executing the excel-mcp-server instance.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">critical</category><category domain="type">advisory</category></item></channel></rss>