{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/elastic-stack/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["Elastic Stack","Auditd Manager","Auditbeat","General Purpose LLM v2"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["endpoint","llm","linux","threat-detection","collection","command-and-control","exfiltration","auditd","detection-rule"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Elastic"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eElastic has released an LLM-powered detection rule designed to identify potentially malicious \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e activity on Linux systems. This rule, updated in July 2026, integrates with Auditd Manager or Auditbeat to collect process execution events, specifically targeting \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e invocations. It normalizes command-line arguments, redacts sensitive information like credentials, and then uses Elastic's General Purpose LLM v2 to assess whether the activity indicates ingress tool transfer (T1105), command and control (TA0011), or data exfiltration (T1048, T1005). The rule is configured to filter out known benign \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e destinations, such as local loopbacks, cloud platform services (Azure, GCP), and common vendor repositories (Microsoft, GitHub, Elastic), to reduce false positives. Alerts are generated only for high-confidence (above 0.7) positive or suspicious verdicts from the LLM, providing security teams with intelligent triage for \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e usage.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis brief describes a detection mechanism rather than an observed attack campaign. Therefore, a specific attack chain is not provided, as the rule monitors for general malicious \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e activity, which can occur at various stages of an attack.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful malicious \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e activity on a Linux host can lead to severe consequences, including remote code execution if an attacker downloads and executes a malicious payload, establishment of persistent command and control (C2) channels for ongoing access, or unauthorized data exfiltration using \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e's upload functionalities (\u003ccode\u003e--post-file\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e--post-data\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e--body-file\u003c/code\u003e). The exposure of credentials or tokens via command-line arguments, even if redacted in logs, could facilitate further compromise or lateral movement. The detection rule aims to mitigate these impacts by identifying and triaging such activities promptly, preventing adversaries from achieving their objectives undetected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eConfigure Auditd Manager or Auditbeat on all Linux endpoints to collect process execution events, including \u003ccode\u003eprocess.name\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eprocess.args\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003eprocess.title\u003c/code\u003e, as required by the detection rule.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule provided in this brief to your SIEM to detect suspicious \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e activity, which can then be further triaged.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview the \u003ccode\u003eiocs\u003c/code\u003e list of explicitly excluded benign destinations and add any additional routine, verified benign \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e destinations specific to your environment to your allow-lists to reduce false positives.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate high-confidence alerts generated by the rule by examining \u003ccode\u003eEsql.verdict\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eEsql.confidence\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eEsql.summary\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eEsql.dest_host\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003eEsql.command_line_values\u003c/code\u003e within your Elastic Stack.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIf payload execution, command-and-control, or data exfiltration is confirmed, isolate the affected host immediately.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRotate any credentials or tokens that may have been exposed in \u003ccode\u003ewget\u003c/code\u003e command lines, even if redacted in logs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-07-20T20:24:01Z","date_published":"2026-07-20T20:24:01Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-llm-wget-triage/","summary":"Elastic has developed a detection rule that monitors non-allowlisted `wget` activity on Linux hosts using Auditd Manager or Auditbeat, leveraging an Elastic LLM to triage `wget` executions for potential ingress tool transfer, command and control, or data exfiltration attempts to untrusted destinations, generating alerts only for high-confidence positive or suspicious verdicts.","title":"LLM-Based Triage of Wget Activity on Linux Hosts","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-llm-wget-triage/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Elastic Stack","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}