Attack Chain

1. Precondition: A Directus instance is configured with CACHE_ENABLED=true and has at least one active directus_shares configured, providing scoped read access to sensitive items (e.g., /items/articles).
2. Share Configuration: A legitimate administrator creates a share token (e.g., Share A) to grant specific, limited read access to particular data items within Directus.
3. Initial Request: A user possessing Share Token A makes an authenticated request to access shared, sensitive data (e.g., GET /items/articles/123).
4. Cache Population: Directus processes the request, applies the specific authorization rules associated with Share Token A, retrieves the appropriate permission-filtered data, and stores this response in the configured cache.
5. Cache Key Derivation Flaw: The cache key is generated using an incomplete set of authorization contexts (e.g., version, path, query, and accountability.user), with accountability.user being null for share tokens and anonymous requests.
6. Subsequent Request: A different user, either holding Share Token B (distinct from Share A) or making an anonymous request, attempts to access the exact same URL (GET /items/articles/123).
7. Cache Hit & Bypass: Due to the identical cache key derived from the previous request, Directus retrieves and serves the already cached response without performing a fresh authorization check against Share Token B's or the anonymous user's specific permissions.
8. Unauthorized Data Access: The second user (with Share Token B or anonymous) gains unauthorized access to the sensitive data originally filtered and intended only for Share Token A.

Impact

This vulnerability can lead to severe cross-share confidentiality breaches. Any permission-filtered response populated in the cache by one share token can be served to any other share token holder or an anonymous request that subsequently hits the same URL and query, bypassing intended authorization. For instance, an anonymous client could retrieve sensitive, share-scoped data without any authentication. While password protection on shares exists at the JWT issuance stage, a cached response bypasses this once populated. The data leak persists for the duration of the CACHE_TTL window (typically 5-30 minutes) and can survive server restarts if CACHE_STORE=redis is used. The scope of the leaked data depends on the original share's permissions, ranging from primary keys to full content for shares backed by roles with broader field access. The bypass is read-only, meaning no write operations are affected.

Recommendation

• Patch CVE-2026-61836: Upgrade all Directus instances to version 12.0.0 or newer immediately to mitigate the vulnerability.
• Review CACHE_ENABLED Configuration: For instances that cannot be immediately patched, consider disabling CACHE_ENABLED by setting it to false in your Directus configuration, especially if directus_shares are in use and sensitive data is involved.
• Audit Share Configurations: Review all directus_shares to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege, minimizing the amount of sensitive data exposed even in the event of a bypass.