{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","favicon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.png","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/dbhub--0.22.6/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","icon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/apple-touch-icon.png","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":true,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["DBHub (0.21.2)","dbhub (\u003c 0.22.6)"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["web-vulnerability","dns-rebinding","database-security","vulnerability","rce"],"_cs_type":"threat","_cs_vendors":["Bytebase"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eDBHub version 0.21.2, when deployed using the \u003ccode\u003e--transport http\u003c/code\u003e configuration, contains a critical flaw in its DNS rebinding protection mechanism. The server attempts to prevent unauthorized cross-origin requests by validating that the \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e header matches the \u003ccode\u003eHost\u003c/code\u003e header. However, this check is insufficient as it does not enforce a whitelist of trusted hostnames. An attacker can perform a DNS rebinding attack to cause a victim's browser to resolve an attacker-controlled domain to the IP address where DBHub is running. Because both the \u003ccode\u003eHost\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e headers in the rebind request will match the attacker-controlled hostname, the server erroneously trusts the request. This allows an attacker to interact with the \u003ccode\u003e/mcp\u003c/code\u003e endpoint and dispatch JSON-RPC tool calls, such as \u003ccode\u003eexecute_sql\u003c/code\u003e, directly from the victim's browser. This vulnerability bypasses traditional local network boundaries and does not require authentication, potentially exposing sensitive database contents to exfiltration.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker registers a domain (e.g., dbhub-rebind.example) and configures an authoritative DNS server to provide a short Time-To-Live (TTL).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVictim is lured to an attacker-controlled website hosted at the attacker's domain, which resolves initially to an attacker-controlled web server.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker's web server delivers malicious JavaScript to the victim's browser.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker updates the DNS record for their domain to point to the victim's internal loopback or local network IP where DBHub is running.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe malicious JavaScript triggers a cross-origin HTTP request to the DBHub server at the attacker's domain (e.g., dbhub-rebind.example:8080).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDBHub's middleware extracts the \u003ccode\u003eHost\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e headers, finds they match the attacker's domain, and validates the request as authorized.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDBHub dispatches the JSON-RPC command, executing arbitrary SQL queries on the connected database.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAttacker receives query results from the JSON-RPC response via the browser's ability to read the reflected origin, completing the exfiltration.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows unauthenticated execution of SQL queries on databases connected to a DBHub instance. Depending on the server's configured permissions, an attacker can enumerate schemas, read sensitive database contents, and perform write operations. As the interaction occurs through the victim's browser, the attacker can exfiltrate data without needing direct network access to the target machine or bypassing local firewall rules, significantly impacting organizations using DBHub for local database management.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePrioritized actions for security teams:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImmediately audit all DBHub deployments to identify instances using the \u003ccode\u003e--transport http\u003c/code\u003e configuration.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBind DBHub instances to \u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1\u003c/code\u003e rather than \u003ccode\u003e0.0.0.0\u003c/code\u003e to restrict network accessibility.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement an explicit allowed-hosts and allowed-origins policy in local infrastructure proxies if DBHub must be exposed.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRequire a static authentication token for all \u003ccode\u003e/mcp\u003c/code\u003e requests, independent of the HTTP transport's origin validation.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRestrict the \u003ccode\u003eexecute_sql\u003c/code\u003e tool permissions to read-only for production database connections where possible.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-09-24T20:05:22Z","date_published":"2026-09-24T20:03:55Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-dbhub-dns-rebind/","summary":"DBHub 0.21.2 fails to securely validate hostnames in its HTTP transport mode, allowing attackers to use DNS rebinding to execute arbitrary SQL queries via a victim's browser.","title":"DNS Rebinding Vulnerability in DBHub HTTP Transport","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-dbhub-dns-rebind/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Dbhub (\u003c 0.22.6)","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}