CryptoLib (< 1.4.0) - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/cryptolib--1.4.0/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioThu, 29 Oct 2026 22:23:25 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.pngCraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/3232https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svgNasa CryptoLib: Heap overflow in Crypto_TM_ProcessSecurity (CVE-2025-30216)https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-cve-2025-30216-poc/Thu, 29 Oct 2026 22:23:25 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-cve-2025-30216-poc/A high-severity heap overflow vulnerability in Nasa CryptoLib (v1.3.3 and prior) allows unauthenticated remote attackers to trigger out-of-bounds memory corruption via malformed CCSDS protocol packets, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.Nasa CryptoLib versions 1.3.3 and prior contain a heap overflow vulnerability in the Crypto_TM_ProcessSecurity function within crypto_tm.c. The vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of the Secondary Header Length field in CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol packets. When the provided length exceeds the actual packet size, an out-of-bounds memcpy occurs into the p_new_dec_frame heap-allocated buffer. A public proof-of-concept (PoC) exists that demonstrates packet generation to trigger this memory corruption.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to corrupt heap memory. Potential impacts include arbitrary code execution, system instability, or denial of service on systems utilizing the core Flight System (cFS).

Recommendation

  • Upgrade Nasa CryptoLib to the version containing the fix referenced in commit 810fd66d592c883125272fef123c3240db2f170f.
  • Implement strict bounds checking for all incoming CCSDS packet header fields before passing data to memcpy operations.
  • Monitor network traffic directed toward systems running cFS for malformed CCSDS packets matching the logic: claimed_length > (total_length - (header_offset + length_field_size)).
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