{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/containerized-data-importer-cdi/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[{"cvss":7.7,"id":"CVE-2026-17527"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["Containerized Data Importer (CDI)"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["containerization","kubernetes","privilege-escalation","data-exfiltration","cloud"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Red Hat"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eCVE-2026-17527 describes a high-severity vulnerability within the Containerized Data Importer (CDI) component of Kubernetes, impacting users with the \u003ccode\u003ecdi.kubevirt.io:view\u003c/code\u003e ClusterRole. This role, designed for read-only access to CDI resources, erroneously includes a \u003ccode\u003ecreate\u003c/code\u003e permission on the \u003ccode\u003edatavolumes/source\u003c/code\u003e subresource. An attacker who has been granted this \u003ccode\u003eview\u003c/code\u003e role, potentially cluster-wide via a \u003ccode\u003eClusterRoleBinding\u003c/code\u003e, and also possesses \u003ccode\u003eedit\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e privileges within any single namespace, can exploit this flaw. The vulnerability allows them to clone the contents of any PersistentVolumeClaim (PVC) across the cluster into a namespace they control. This bypasses Kubernetes' inherent namespace isolation mechanisms and subverts the intended read-only nature of the \u003ccode\u003eview\u003c/code\u003e role, leading to unauthorized data exfiltration.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInitial Access / Privilege Acquisition\u003c/strong\u003e: An attacker obtains Kubernetes credentials that grant them the \u003ccode\u003ecdi.kubevirt.io:view\u003c/code\u003e ClusterRole (potentially deployed cluster-wide) and also \u003ccode\u003eedit\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e access to \u003cem\u003eany\u003c/em\u003e single namespace.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTarget Identification\u003c/strong\u003e: The attacker identifies a \u003ccode\u003ePersistentVolumeClaim (PVC)\u003c/code\u003e within the Kubernetes cluster from which they intend to exfiltrate data. This PVC can reside in any namespace, regardless of the attacker's direct access to it.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthorization Bypass\u003c/strong\u003e: The attacker leverages the improper \u003ccode\u003ecreate\u003c/code\u003e permission on the \u003ccode\u003edatavolumes/source\u003c/code\u003e subresource, which is inadvertently granted by the \u003ccode\u003ecdi.kubevirt.io:view\u003c/code\u003e ClusterRole, despite its intended read-only purpose.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDataVolume Creation\u003c/strong\u003e: The attacker crafts and submits a request to the Kubernetes API to create a new \u003ccode\u003eDataVolume\u003c/code\u003e in a namespace they control, specifying the identified target PVC as the source for a clone operation.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Cloning\u003c/strong\u003e: The Containerized Data Importer (CDI) system processes this \u003ccode\u003eDataVolume\u003c/code\u003e creation request. Due to the authorization bypass, CDI validates the attacker's \u003ccode\u003ecreate\u003c/code\u003e permission on \u003ccode\u003edatavolumes/source\u003c/code\u003e and proceeds to initiate a clone of the specified target PVC into the attacker-controlled namespace.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Access and Exfiltration\u003c/strong\u003e: Once the cloning process is complete, a new PersistentVolume (PV) and PVC are available within the attacker's controlled namespace. The attacker then accesses these cloned resources, gaining unauthorized read access to the sensitive data originally stored in the target PVC.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eImpact Realization\u003c/strong\u003e: The attacker successfully bypasses Kubernetes namespace isolation and the intended read-only guarantees of the \u003ccode\u003ecdi.kubevirt.io:view\u003c/code\u003e role, achieving silent data exfiltration from arbitrary PVCs across the cluster.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of CVE-2026-17527 leads to unauthorized data exfiltration from any PersistentVolumeClaim (PVC) within the Kubernetes cluster. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass critical namespace isolation mechanisms, which are fundamental to multi-tenant Kubernetes environments. The primary impact is the loss of data confidentiality, as sensitive information stored in PVCs can be accessed without authorization. Organizations using CDI in Kubernetes environments are at risk of significant data breaches if this flaw is exploited, as an attacker with limited access can escalate privileges to access a broader range of sensitive data than their assigned roles intend. The CVSS v3.1 Base Score for this vulnerability is 7.7, indicating a high severity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and audit all Kubernetes \u003ccode\u003eClusterRoleBinding\u003c/code\u003e configurations to identify any service accounts or users assigned the \u003ccode\u003ecdi.kubevirt.io:view\u003c/code\u003e ClusterRole.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRestrict \u003ccode\u003eClusterRoleBinding\u003c/code\u003e of the \u003ccode\u003ecdi.kubevirt.io:view\u003c/code\u003e role to the minimum necessary entities, ideally removing any cluster-wide bindings.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePatch Containerized Data Importer (CDI) to the latest secure version that addresses CVE-2026-17527 immediately upon availability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement Kubernetes audit logging to monitor for suspicious \u003ccode\u003eDataVolume\u003c/code\u003e creation or clone operations, especially those originating from users or service accounts with the \u003ccode\u003ecdi.kubevirt.io:view\u003c/code\u003e role.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-07-27T10:20:48Z","date_published":"2026-07-27T10:20:48Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-cve-2026-17527-cdi-privesc/","summary":"A vulnerability in the Containerized Data Importer (CDI) for Kubernetes, identified as CVE-2026-17527, allows privilege escalation and data exfiltration through an improperly configured `cdi.kubevirt.io:view` ClusterRole, enabling attackers with partial access to clone and access data from any PersistentVolumeClaim in the cluster.","title":"CVE-2026-17527: Kubernetes CDI Privilege Escalation and Data Exfiltration","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-cve-2026-17527-cdi-privesc/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Containerized Data Importer (CDI)","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}