<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Budibase Server &lt; 3.39.9 - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/budibase-server--3.39.9/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 11:01:14 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/budibase-server--3.39.9/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Budibase Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability via PWA-zip Symlink Upload (CVE-2026-54352)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-budibase-arbitrary-file-read/</link><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 11:01:14 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-budibase-arbitrary-file-read/</guid><description>A critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-54352, in Budibase server allows an authenticated workspace builder to perform arbitrary file reads on the host system by uploading a crafted PWA zip file containing a symbolic link, leading to credential compromise and privilege escalation, potentially enabling a full global administrator takeover.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A critical arbitrary file read vulnerability (CVE-2026-54352) affects Budibase server versions up to <code>3.39.0</code> (HEAD <code>feab995</code>, released 2026-05-20). This flaw allows an authenticated workspace builder to read any file accessible by the server process, including highly sensitive configuration files like <code>/data/.env</code> (containing <code>JWT_SECRET</code>, <code>INTERNAL_API_KEY</code>, and database credentials) and system files such as <code>/etc/passwd</code> or <code>/etc/shadow</code>. The vulnerability stems from improper handling of symbolic links within uploaded PWA <code>.zip</code> files by the <code>extract-zip@2.0.1</code> library, coupled with insufficient validation in Budibase's icon processing logic. When exploited, it can lead to credential disclosure, privilege escalation to global administrator, and even cross-tenant exposure in multi-tenant environments. This vulnerability impacts self-hosted Budibase deployments, especially those running the default Docker image where the Node server executes as <code>root</code>.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>An attacker gains authenticated access as a workspace builder to a Budibase instance, obtaining necessary cookies and CSRF tokens from <code>GET /api/global/self</code>.</li>
<li>The attacker crafts a <code>.zip</code> archive containing a symbolic link, for example, <code>evil.png</code>, which targets a sensitive file on the server's filesystem, such as <code>/data/.env</code>.</li>
<li>The attacker includes an <code>icons.json</code> file within the <code>.zip</code> that references the created symbolic link, for example, <code>{&quot;icons&quot;:[{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;evil.png&quot;, ...}]}</code>.</li>
<li>The attacker sends an HTTP POST request to <code>/api/pwa/process-zip</code> with the crafted <code>.zip</code> file in the request body, using their authenticated session.</li>
<li>The Budibase server, using <code>extract-zip@2.0.1</code>, extracts the <code>.zip</code> file into a temporary directory, preserving the absolute target of the symbolic link.</li>
<li>During PWA icon processing, the server's validator (<code>packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268</code>) resolves the icon path, follows the symbolic link using <code>fs.existsSync</code>, and then opens the target file using <code>fsp.open</code> to stream its content.</li>
<li>The content of the sensitive target file (e.g., <code>/data/.env</code>) is then streamed into MinIO and made available via a new public URL, typically <code>GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png</code>.</li>
<li>The attacker retrieves the sensitive file's content by making a GET request to the newly generated PWA asset URL, completing the arbitrary file read.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-54352 leads to the disclosure of critical secrets from the Budibase server's host system. This includes <code>JWT_SECRET</code>, <code>INTERNAL_API_KEY</code>, <code>MINIO_ACCESS_KEY</code>, <code>MINIO_SECRET_KEY</code>, <code>REDIS_PASSWORD</code>, <code>COUCHDB_PASSWORD</code>, and <code>DATABASE_URL</code> from the <code>/data/.env</code> file. With the leaked <code>JWT_SECRET</code>, an attacker can forge HS256 JWTs, escalating privileges from a workspace builder to a global administrator. This allows for full compromise of the Budibase instance, including potential cross-tenant data access on multi-tenant installations. Furthermore, if the Budibase Docker container runs as <code>root</code> (the default configuration), system files like <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> are also exposed, providing additional credential harvesting opportunities.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Immediately update Budibase server to version <code>3.39.9</code> or newer to patch CVE-2026-54352.</li>
<li>Rotate all credentials found in <code>/data/.env</code>, including <code>JWT_SECRET</code>, <code>INTERNAL_API_KEY</code>, <code>MINIO_*</code>, <code>REDIS_PASSWORD</code>, <code>COUCHDB_PASSWORD</code>, and <code>DATABASE_URL</code>, especially if using self-hosted Budibase deployments.</li>
<li>Implement strong logging and monitoring for attempts to access sensitive file paths mentioned in the IOCs (e.g., <code>/data/.env</code>, <code>/etc/passwd</code>, <code>/etc/shadow</code>) via unexpected application endpoints.</li>
<li>Ensure that the Budibase server process does not run with <code>root</code> privileges within its container or host environment, following the principle of least privilege, to limit the blast radius of arbitrary file read vulnerabilities.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">critical</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>arbitrary-file-read</category><category>web-vulnerability</category><category>privilege-escalation</category><category>credential-access</category><category>symlink</category><category>budibase</category><category>cloud</category><category>saas</category></item></channel></rss>