<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>AWS Systems Manager — CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/aws-systems-manager/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 09:45:04 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/aws-systems-manager/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>AWS SSM Session Manager Child Process Execution</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-aws-ssm-child-process/</link><pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 09:45:04 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-05-aws-ssm-child-process/</guid><description>This rule identifies process start events where the parent process is the AWS Systems Manager (SSM) Session Manager worker, which adversaries may abuse for remote execution and lateral movement using legitimate AWS credentials and IAM permissions.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The AWS Systems Manager (SSM) Session Manager provides interactive shell access to EC2 instances and hybrid nodes without requiring bastion hosts or open inbound ports. This capability is legitimately used by administrators for managing their AWS infrastructure. However, adversaries can abuse Session Manager for remote execution and lateral movement within an AWS environment if they obtain valid AWS credentials and IAM permissions that allow <code>ssm:StartSession</code> or related API calls. This attack vector allows them to execute commands as child processes of the SSM session worker. This activity can be difficult to detect due to the use of legitimate AWS services.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Adversary gains access to AWS credentials with <code>ssm:StartSession</code> permissions, possibly through credential harvesting or compromised EC2 instance roles.</li>
<li>Adversary uses the AWS CLI or API to initiate an SSM Session Manager session to a target EC2 instance or managed node.</li>
<li>The <code>ssm-session-worker</code> process is started on the target host.</li>
<li>Adversary executes commands within the SSM session, which manifest as child processes of <code>ssm-session-worker</code>.</li>
<li>The executed commands may involve reconnaissance activities, such as gathering system information or network configuration.</li>
<li>The adversary may attempt to download malicious payloads or tools to the compromised instance.</li>
<li>The adversary uses the compromised host as a pivot point for lateral movement to other AWS resources.</li>
<li>Adversary achieves their objective, such as data exfiltration or deployment of malware.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to EC2 instances and managed nodes within an AWS environment. This can lead to data breaches, system compromise, and disruption of services. The abuse of legitimate AWS services like SSM Session Manager can make detection more challenging, potentially prolonging the attacker&rsquo;s dwell time.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Deploy the Sigma rules in this brief to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect suspicious child processes of the AWS SSM Session Manager worker.</li>
<li>Monitor AWS CloudTrail logs for <code>StartSession</code>, <code>ResumeSession</code>, or related SSM API calls to identify the IAM principal initiating sessions (reference: Investigating AWS SSM Session Manager Child Process Execution section).</li>
<li>Implement strict IAM policies and least privilege principles to limit which users and roles have permissions to start SSM sessions.</li>
<li>Review SSM and VPC endpoint policies to ensure they are configured securely (reference: Response and remediation section).</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">medium</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>cloud</category><category>aws</category><category>execution</category><category>lateral-movement</category></item></channel></rss>