{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/aws-sso/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["AWS IAM","AWS Security Token Service","AWS CloudTrail","AWS SSO"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["cloud","aws","persistence","privilege-escalation","defense-evasion"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AWS"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis brief details detection of suspicious AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) API operations executed using temporary session credentials, characterized by access key IDs beginning with \u0026quot;ASIA\u0026quot;. These temporary credentials are typically generated by services like \u003ccode\u003ests:GetSessionToken\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ests:AssumeRole\u003c/code\u003e, or AWS SSO logins and are intended for short-term, programmatic use. It is highly unusual for legitimate users or automated processes to perform privileged IAM actions, such as creating users, updating policies, or managing multi-factor authentication (MFA), directly with these short-lived tokens. Such activity may signal credential theft, session hijacking, or the abuse of temporary credentials associated with a privileged role, enabling an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or disable security protections within an AWS environment. The detection specifically excludes legitimate console login sessions, significantly reducing false positives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInitial Access\u003c/strong\u003e: An attacker gains initial access to an AWS environment, often through compromised long-term credentials (e.g., IAM user access keys, compromised AWS SSO accounts) obtained via phishing, malware, or exposed secrets.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCredential Access\u003c/strong\u003e: Using the compromised long-term credentials, the attacker authenticates to AWS.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSTS Token Generation\u003c/strong\u003e: The attacker generates temporary session credentials (access keys starting with \u0026quot;ASIA\u0026quot;) via AWS Security Token Service (STS) calls like \u003ccode\u003ests:GetSessionToken\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ests:AssumeRole\u003c/code\u003e. This allows them to blend in with normal programmatic activity.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePrivileged IAM Action\u003c/strong\u003e: The attacker immediately utilizes these temporary session tokens to perform sensitive IAM API operations. Examples include \u003ccode\u003eiam:CreateAccessKey\u003c/code\u003e for a new backdoor user, \u003ccode\u003eiam:PutUserPolicy\u003c/code\u003e to elevate permissions, or \u003ccode\u003eiam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\u003c/code\u003e to modify trust relationships for privilege escalation.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePersistence Established\u003c/strong\u003e: By creating new access keys, modifying existing policies, or altering role trust policies, the attacker establishes persistent access to the AWS environment.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePrivilege Escalation\u003c/strong\u003e: The newly created or modified IAM entities grant the attacker higher-level permissions than their initial access, allowing them to expand control.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eImpact\u003c/strong\u003e: The attacker proceeds to achieve their ultimate objective, which could include data exfiltration, resource manipulation, infrastructure disruption, or cryptomining, leveraging their escalated privileges.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of temporary session token abuse can lead to severe consequences for an AWS environment. Attackers can establish persistent access by creating new backdoor users or modifying existing IAM policies, enabling continued unauthorized operations. They can escalate privileges to gain control over critical resources, disable security mechanisms like MFA for other accounts, and exfiltrate sensitive data or deploy malicious resources such as cryptominers. The primary impact includes unauthorized data access, resource compromise, and potential financial losses due to resource misuse or regulatory fines stemming from data breaches.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026quot;AWS IAM API Calls via Temporary Session Tokens\u0026quot; to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect unusual IAM API calls via temporary session tokens.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable AWS CloudTrail logging for all management events and data events, ensuring \u003ccode\u003eiam.amazonaws.com\u003c/code\u003e events are captured for detection by the provided Sigma rule.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview \u003ccode\u003eaws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eaws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type\u003c/code\u003e fields for any alerts generated by the Sigma rule to identify the originating user or role.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eExamine \u003ccode\u003eaws.cloudtrail.user_identity.session_context.mfa_authenticated\u003c/code\u003e when investigating alerts, as an absence of MFA authentication may indicate token misuse.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInspect \u003ccode\u003esource.ip\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003euser_agent.original\u003c/code\u003e for any detected activity to identify unexpected origins or tools.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIf unauthorized activity is confirmed, immediately revoke the temporary session by invalidating the associated IAM credentials as described in the investigation guide.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRequire MFA for all privileged actions using \u003ccode\u003eaws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\u003c/code\u003e conditions in IAM policies to prevent future abuse of compromised credentials.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-07-15T14:15:41Z","date_published":"2026-07-15T14:15:41Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-aws-iam-session-token-abuse/","summary":"This detection rule identifies suspicious AWS IAM API operations performed using temporary session credentials (access keys starting with ASIA) that are not sourced from console logins, indicating potential credential theft, session hijacking, or abuse of privileged temporary credentials by an attacker for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion within the AWS environment.","title":"Suspicious AWS IAM API Calls via Temporary Session Tokens","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-aws-iam-session-token-abuse/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - AWS SSO","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}