<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Autogen (&gt;= 0.13.2, &lt;= 0.14.1) - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/autogen--0.13.2--0.14.1/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:37:20 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/autogen--0.13.2--0.14.1/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>AG2: SandboxShellTool command injection (CVE-2026-113663)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-11-ag2-shell-injection/</link><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:37:20 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-11-ag2-shell-injection/</guid><description>The SandboxShellTool in AG2 and AutoGen fails to filter newline characters, allowing attackers to bypass command allowlists and read-only restrictions to execute arbitrary shell commands via CVE-2026-113663.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <code>SandboxShellTool</code> within the AG2 and AutoGen frameworks contains a command injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-113663) due to insufficient input validation. The tool relies on a denylist of shell operators (e.g., <code>;</code>, <code>&amp;&amp;</code>, <code>|</code>) to enforce <code>allowed</code> command allowlists and <code>readonly=True</code> modes. Because newline characters (<code>\n</code>, <code>\r</code>) are not included in this denylist, an attacker can embed newlines to chain arbitrary commands. When the tool executes the input using <code>sh -c</code>, the shell treats the newline as a command separator, successfully executing subsequent malicious instructions. This issue is particularly critical when using the <code>LocalEnvironment()</code> backend, which executes commands directly on the host process without containerized isolation.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation allows for full command execution on the host machine running the agent. This is reachable through indirect prompt injection where an LLM is coerced into providing a command string containing a newline, bypassing intended security boundaries of the sandbox tool.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Update <code>ag2</code> to version 1.1.1 or later.</li>
<li>Update <code>autogen</code> to version 0.14.2 or later.</li>
<li>For deployments currently unable to patch, ensure that agents using <code>SandboxShellTool</code> operate within strictly isolated environments (e.g., containerized sandboxes) rather than the default <code>LocalEnvironment()</code>.</li>
<li>Review agent logs for shell commands containing unexpected newline characters if the underlying application telemetry captures raw tool inputs.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>command-injection</category><category>vulnerability</category><category>agent-security</category></item></channel></rss>