Attack Chain

1. Attacker crafts a malicious URL containing a vulnerable Authorizer endpoint (e.g., ForgotPassword) and injects an attacker-controlled redirect_uri pointing to a malicious site (e.g., https://attacker.com/steal).
2. The victim initiates a password reset request, signup, magic link login, or other vulnerable action on the legitimate Authorizer instance.
3. Authorizer generates a password reset token, magic link token, or full auth tokens and appends it to the attacker-controlled redirect_uri without validation.
4. The victim receives a legitimate email or link from Authorizer containing the malicious URL.
5. The victim clicks the link, redirecting their browser to the attacker-controlled site.
6. The attacker-controlled site receives the sensitive token or full auth tokens as URL parameters (e.g., https://attacker.com/steal?token=<reset_token> or https://attacker.com/steal?access_token=<access_token>&id_token=<id_token>&refresh_token=<refresh_token>).
7. The attacker harvests the token(s) from the URL.
8. The attacker uses the stolen token(s) to reset the victim's password, gain unauthorized access to their account, or impersonate the victim.

Impact

This vulnerability can lead to complete account takeover due to stolen password reset tokens and full session compromise via stolen access tokens, ID tokens, and refresh tokens. It also affects passwordless login mechanisms by compromising magic link tokens. The attacker requires no prior authentication and only needs to trick the victim into clicking a link. This vulnerability affects any Authorizer instance running a vulnerable version, potentially impacting all users of applications relying on the vulnerable Authorizer service. The exposure of tokens in URL parameters also leads to information leakage through browser history, server logs, and referrer headers.

Recommendation

• Upgrade Authorizer to a version containing the fix for this vulnerability (>= commit after 73679fa).
• Implement robust validation of the redirect_uri parameter in all affected endpoints, specifically ForgotPassword, MagicLinkLogin, Signup, InviteMembers, OAuthLoginHandler, and VerifyEmailHandler, using a function similar to validators.IsValidOrigin() as used in /app handler.
• Modify the default AllowedOrigins in cmd/root.go to a more restrictive value than ["*"] to force explicit configuration and prevent the OAuth endpoint's validation from becoming a no-op.
• Deploy the Sigma rule Detect Suspicious Redirect URI Parameters to identify potential exploitation attempts in web server logs.
• Monitor web server logs for requests to the affected Authorizer endpoints containing suspicious redirect_uri parameters, using the IOC https://attacker.com/steal as a starting point for identifying attacker infrastructure.