<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Appointment Booking Software (&lt; 2.0.0) - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/appointment-booking-software--2.0.0/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 22:05:14 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/appointment-booking-software--2.0.0/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>OpenReception: Host header injection account takeover (CVE-2026-58202)</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-openreception-host-injection/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 22:05:14 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-openreception-host-injection/</guid><description>OpenReception appointment booking software prior to version 2.0.0 is vulnerable to host header injection in the confirmation email generation process, allowing unauthenticated attackers to hijack user accounts.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>OpenReception versions prior to 2.0.0 contain a vulnerability in the '/api/auth/resend-confirmation' endpoint where the Host header is used to construct account confirmation links without validation or allowlisting. An unauthenticated attacker can force the system to send an email to a victim containing a link directed to an attacker-controlled domain. When the victim clicks the link, the one-time confirmation token is exposed, enabling the attacker to finalize the account registration and attach an attacker-controlled passkey.</p>
<h2 id="attack-chain">Attack Chain</h2>
<ol>
<li>Attacker identifies a target user's email address associated with a pending invite.</li>
<li>Attacker sends a POST request to '/api/auth/resend-confirmation'.</li>
<li>Attacker injects a malicious hostname into the 'Host' header of the request.</li>
<li>Application generates a confirmation email containing a link using the malicious host.</li>
<li>Victim receives the confirmation email and clicks the malicious link.</li>
<li>Attacker captures the one-time confirmation token from the request logs at their server.</li>
<li>Attacker uses the token to confirm the account on the legitimate tenant domain.</li>
<li>Attacker registers a passkey and completes the account takeover.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation results in full account takeover, allowing attackers to access private booking data and assume the identity of the victim user within the platform.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade OpenReception to version 2.0.0 or later immediately.</li>
<li>Implement strict Host header validation or explicit per-tenant proxy configurations in front-end proxies (e.g., Caddy, Nginx) to ensure requests only match authorized tenant domains.</li>
<li>Audit logs for the '/api/auth/resend-confirmation' endpoint to identify requests containing unrecognized or anomalous 'Host' headers.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category></item></channel></rss>